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THE TEACHING FUNCTION OF PATENTS
Sean B. Seymore*
In theory, a patent serves the public good because the disclosure of the
invention brings new ideas and technologies to the public and induces
inventive activity. But while these roles inherently depend on the ability of
the patent to disseminate technical knowledge, the teaching function of pat-
ents has received very little attention. Indeed, when the document publishes,
it can serve as a form of technical literature. Because patents can, at times,
communicate knowledge as well as, or better than, other information sources,
patents could become a competitive source of technical information. Pres-
ently, however, patents are rarely viewed in this manner. There are several
reasons for this, including the lack of a working example requirement and
the pervasive use of ambiguous or opaque language.
My primary objective is to transform patents into readable teaching doc-
uments. Importantly, if patents are to compete with the technical literature,
then they must provide the same quality of teaching. For this to happen, two
things must occur. First, at least for complex inventions, an applicant must
prove, through adequate detail, that the claimed invention has been con-
structed and works for its intended purpose. Second, applicants must be
allowed to draft the document using clear and concise language, without the
fear of litigation troubles. To achieve both, I contend that working examples
should replace language as the principal measure of claim scope. To imple-
ment this idea, I propose a new examination protocol which gives the U.S.
Patent Office the ability to request working examples when the disclosure's
teaching appears dubious. In exploring criticisms, I argue that, in contrast
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to the current disclosure framework, which can itself thwart innovation, the
proposed regime will produce more technically robust patents, which will
make it easier for subsequent inventors to improve upon existing patented
technology, promote the diffusion of knowledge across disciplines, and serve
as a driver for more creative innovation.
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INTRODUCTION
The patent document serves several stated functions. First, it dis-
closes the invention to the public.' This disclosure must be suffi-
ciently detailed to enable one of ordinary skill in the art to practice
1 The courts often refer to disclosure as the quid pro quo for the inventor's right
to exclude. SeePfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 63 (1998) ("[T]he patent system
represents a carefully crafted bargain that encourages both the creation and the pub-
lic disclosure of new and useful advances in technology, in return for an exclusive
monopoly for a limited period of time.").
[VOL. 85-2622
HeinOnline  -- 85 Notre Dame L. Rev. 622 2009-2010
THE TEACHING FUNCTION OF PATENTS
the invention and provide the best way to do so. 2 Second, it includes
claims which define the scope of the exclusory right and notify inter-
ested members of the public of the activities that will infringe.3 Third,
the document serves as a starting point for patent prosecution,4 as
well as a court's adjudication of patent validity and infringement.5
Yet patents perform functions which extend beyond the legal
sphere. These include, for example, signaling research and develop-
2 The statutory disclosure requirement has four parts, which appear in the first
and second paragraphs of 35 U.S.C. § 112:
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and
of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, con-
cise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it
pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the
same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carry-
ing out his invention.
The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly
pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant
regards as his invention.
35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006) (emphasis added). As the statute indicates, the key elements
of an issued patent (or patent application) are: (1) the written description, which
completely describes the invention, and (2) the claims, which define the scope of
protection.
3 See id.; McClain v. Ortmayer, 141 U.S. 419, 424 (1891) ("The object of the
patent law in requiring the patentee to [distinctly claim his invention] is not only to
secure to him all to which he is entitled, but to apprise the public of what is still open
to them."); Merrill v. Yeomans, 94 U.S. 568, 573-74 (1876) ("It seems to us that noth-
ing can be more just and fair, both to the patentee and to the public, than that the
former should understand, and correctly describe, just what he has invented, and for
what he claims a patent.").
4 Patent law consists of several branches. Patent prosecution describes the pro-
cess by which an inventor, usually through the help of an attorney, files an application
with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (Patent Office) for examination. The
application contains essentially the same elements as an issued patent, including a
written description, drawings, and claims. The patent prosecutor's interaction with
the patent examiner is ex parte. See generally AIAN L. DURHAM, PATENT LAw ESSEN-
TIALs § 5 (3d ed. 2009) (explaining the patent prosecution process). Patent litigation
focuses on issued patents. A patent owner whose rights have been infringed can com-
pel an accused infringer to stop the infringing activity and pay for damages arising
from the infringement that has already occurred. See id. § 11. On the other hand, a
potential infringer can launch a "preemptive strike" against the patentee to seek a
declaratory judgment that the patent is invalid. Id. Finally, patent licensing allows
patent owners to generate royalty income by allowing others to practice the invention.
Id. § 6.3
5 See supra note 4; see also Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1315 (Fed. Cir.
2005) (en banc) (explaining that the patent's written description "'is always highly
relevant to the claim construction analysis . .. [and usually is] dispositive [because] it
is the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed [claim] term'" (quoting Vitron-
ics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996))).
2010] 623
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ment (R&D) strength to customers and competitors6 and inducing
inventive activity.7 This Article focuses on one function that has
received considerably less attention: teaching. The basic idea is that,
while the patentee can exclude others from practicing the invention
until the patent term expires, the technical information disclosed in
the patent document has potential immediate value to the public,8
which can use the information for any purpose that does not infringe
upon the claims.9 Thus, the patent document itself can serve as a
form of technical literature and add to the storehouse of knowledge.' 0
But while patents are in many ways quite similar to other techni-
cal information sources," it is fair to say that they are not often viewed
as an important channel for information flow.'2 Several commenta-
6 See Clarisa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. CHI. L. REv. 625, 647-49 (2002).
7 See, e.g., Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20J.L. &
ECON. 265, 267-71 (1977) (articulating the prospect theory of patent law).
8 CRAIG ALLEN NARD, THE LAW OF PATENTS 50 (2008). Reading patent applica-
tions also has practical advantages:
Because every patent application contains a complete description of some-
one's technology, and because patent applications are published, and now
appear in on-line databases, you can trawl [through them] for information
vital to your own research and development efforts. Why struggle to solve a
technical problem already solved by another and published in an
application?
Anthony Murphy, Intellectual Property, in INNOVATION: HARNESSING CREATIVITY FOR BUS-
INEss GROWTH 87, 92 (Adam Jolly ed., 2003).
9 Kirin-Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel Ltd., [2004] UKHL 46, [2005]
R.P.C. 9 at 1 77 (Hoffmann, L.J.); see also Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Is There a
Right to Have Something to Say? One View of the Public Domain, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 297,
303 n.23 (2004) ("A patent application must disclose the nature of the invention in
detail, and although the public cannot practice the art during the period of the pat-
ent, it can use the information disclosed in a variety of other ways.").
10 See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481 (1974) (explaining that
as the information disclosed in a patent becomes publicly available it adds to the
"general store of knowledge" and, assumedly, "will stimulate ideas and the eventual
development of further significant advances in the art"); Graham v. John Deere Co.,
383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966) (noting that the Intellectual Property Clause of the Constitution,
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8, requires that patents add to knowledge).
11 Like technical journals, for example, patents show the state of technology, set
forth what others have already achieved, and provide technical information that
others can avoid repeating. THOMAS T. GORDON & ARTHUR S. COOKFAIR, PATENT FUN-
DAMENTALS FOR SCIENTISTS & ENGINEERS 51 (2d ed. 2000). For additional similarities,
see infra notes 217-19 and accompanying text.
12 See Wesley M. Cohen et al., R&D Spillovers, Patents and the Incentives to Innovate
in japan and the United States, 31 RES. POL'Y 1349, 1362-64 (2002) (presenting empiri-
cal research which shows that among information sources for diffusing research and
development, in the United States, patents rank third behind publications and infor-
mal information exchange).
624 [VOL. 85:2
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tors speculate as to why this is so.13 Yet patents can, at times, commu-
nicate knowledge as well as, or better than, other information sources,
and serve as a rich font of technical knowledge.14
Yet, for a variety of reasons, the patent literature is often over-
looked or ignored. First, scientists and engineers are not trained to
read patents. In college and graduate school they learn that research
funding, reputation, and tenure decisions turn on publications in
peer-reviewed technical journals.' 5 This influence often carries over
into industry. 16
Second, many companies, as a matter of policy, have discouraged
their employees from reading the patent literature out of fear that
knowledge of a patent could lay the groundwork for a finding of will-
ful infringement if that patent were litigated.17 With this in mind,
companies have had to weigh the potential benefits of reading a pat-
ent against the risk of enhanced damages.18 However, a recent deci-
sion from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit makes it
substantially more difficult for a patentee to prove willfulness and sug-
gests that simply reading a patent will not trigger the doctrine.19
Third, a disclosure which cannot teach a person having ordinary
skill in the art (PHOSITA)20 how to practice the invention has little
13 See infra note 227.
14 See discussion infra Part II.C.4.
15 See infra note 223 and accompanying text.
16 See GORDON & COOKFAIR, supra note 11, at 52. It appears that attitudes are
changing in the academy, in part due to decreased federal funding, industrial collab-
orations, and potential revenue streams from patent licensing. See Sean B. Seymore,
The "Printed Publication" Bar After Klopfenstein: Has the Federal Circuit Changed the Way
Professors Should Talk About Science?, 40 AKRON L. REv. 493, 499-501 (2007) (discussing
the rise and impact of university technology transfer offices).
17 Michael Risch, The Failure of Public Notice in Patent Prosecution, 21 HARv. J.L. &
TECH. 179, 213 & n.198 (2007); Edwin H. Taylor & Glenn E. Von Tersch, A Proposal to
Shore Up the Foundations of Patent Law that the Underwater Line Eroded, 20 HASTINGS
COMM. & ENT. L.J. 721, 737 (1998); see also Note, The Disclosure Function of the Patent
System (or Lack ThereoJ), 118 HARV. L. REv. 2007, 2017-23 (2005). For a broader discus-
sion of the doctrine and its ill effects on the dissemination of knowledge, see FED.
TRADE COMM'N, To PROMOTE INNOVATION 28-31 (2003); Mark A. Lemley & Ragesh K
Tangri, Ending Patent Law's Willfulness Game, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1085, 1101-02
(2003).
18 See Kimberly A. Moore, Empirical Statistics on Willful Patent Infingement, 14 FED.
CIR. B.J. 227, 232 (2004); The Disclosure Function of the Patent System, supra note 17, at
2019.
19 See In re Seagate Tech., 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc) (hold-
ing that "proof of willful infringement permitting enhanced damages requires at least
a showing of objective recklessness").
20 The PHOSITA is a hypothetical construct of patent law akin to the reasonably
prudent person standard used in torts. Factors relevant to constructing the PHOSITA
20101 625
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substantive value. 21 Indeed, one criticism of patents is that they "sel-
dom teach enough so that someone can actually go out and actually
do the invention without some additional work."2 2 This is true, at
least in part, because an inventor need not create a working embodi-
ment,2 3 or engage in any experimentation, before obtaining the pat-
ent. Rather, an inventor can describe an invention with fictitious,
constructed examples. And, if these examples lack sufficient detail, a
PHOSITA can presumably rely on knowledge in the field to fill in the
missing information. 24 But when this presumption fails, the
PHOSITA can spend a lot of time and effort figuring out how to make
and use the invention.
Fourth, jargon and formalism often make patents indecipher-
able, even to those with specialized knowledge. 25 So, even if a patent
disclosure satisfies the statutory disclosure requirements, the docu-
ment itself has little technical value if it is unreadable.26 In a practical
in a particular technical field include the sophistication of the technology and the
educational level of active workers in the field. See Envtl. Designs, Ltd. v. Union Oil
Co., 713 F.2d 693, 696 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (listing six factors relevant to a determination
of ordinary skill in the art).
21 See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Ignoring Patents, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 19, 22 n.16
(" [R] esearch suggests that scientists don't in fact gain much of their knowledge from
patents, turning instead to other sources.").
22 See The Disclosure Function of the Patent System, supra note 17, at 2025 & n.103
(quoting Competition and Intellectual Property Law and Policy in the Knowledge-Based Econ-
omy: Hearing Before the Fed. Trade Comm'n 49-50, 53 (Mar. 20, 2002) (statement of
Daniel McCurdy)). Unfortunately, there are times when the patentee deliberately
provides an inadequate disclosure. See infra note 62.
23 An "embodiment" is a concrete form of an invention (like a chemical com-
pound or a widget) described in a patent application or patent. ROBERT PATRICK
MERGES &JOHN FITZGERALD DuFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY 26-27 (3d ed. 2002).
24 The specification need not "necessarily describe how to make and use every
possible variant of the claimed invention, for the artisan's knowledge of the prior art
and routine experimentation can often fill gaps." AK Steel Corp. v. Sollac, 344 F.3d
1234, 1244 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
25 See, e.g., Daniel C. Munson, The Patent-Trade Secret Decision: An Industrial Perspec-
tive, 78 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OvF. Soc'v 689, 713-14 (1996) (observing that chemical
patents tend to be "shrouded in chemical nomenclature," which makes them hard to
comprehend); The Disclosure Function of the Patent System, supra note 17, at 2022
(explaining that patents "'are notoriously hard to interpret'" (quoting Matthew D.
Powers & Steven C. Carlson, The Evolution and Impact of the Doctrine of Willful Patent
Infringement, 51 SYRACUSE L. REV. 53, 102 (2001))). Peer-reviewed scientific publica-
tions have faced similar criticisms, but the journals are taking steps to tackle the prob-
lem. See, e.g., Jonathan Knight, Clear as Mud, 423 NATURE 376, 376-78 (2003)
(describing various efforts to help scientists improve their manuscripts).
26 Cf Martin W. Gregory, Commentary, The Infectiousness of Pompous Prose, 360
NATURE 11, 12 (1992) (making a similar argument for scientific journal articles).
[VOL. 85:2626
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sense, this incomprehensibility could become relevant when a paten-
tee tries to attract and negotiate terms with potential licensees.27
It is now time to transform the patent into a readable teaching
document. This Article seeks to show that a new standard of disclo-
sure will allow patents to achieve this goal. This Article, the first to
closely consider teaching as an important function of the patent sys-
tem,28 is the next piece in a larger project, undertaken to bridge the
disconnect between patent law and the norms of science.29 Part I
begins by elucidating why patents are difficult to understand. Part II
proposes that raising the standard of disclosure, by allowing the U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office (Patent Office) to request working
examples, will improve the teaching function of patents. In this Part, I
contend that changing the examination protocol will allow patents to
quickly become competitive sources of technical information. Part III
explores some of the concerns that accompany the proposal. I argue
that, in contrast to the current disclosure framework, which can itself
thwart innovation, the proposed regime will produce more technically
robust patents, which will make it easier for subsequent inventors to
improve upon existing patented technology.
27 Several commentators contend that licensing to non-inventors works best when
the technical information disclosed in the patent is understandable. See, e.g., SCOTr
SHANE, ACADEMIC ENTREPRENEURSHIP 111 (2004). When it is not, potential licensees
might seek to involve the inventor in the contracting relationship to gain access to the
latter's know-how or tacit knowledge. See Ashish Arora, Contracting for Tacit Knowledge:
The Provision of Technical Seroices in Technology Licensing Contracts, 50 J. DEV. ECON. 233,
246 (1996); Dan L. Burk, The Role of Patent Law in Knowledge Codification, 23 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1009, 1021 (2008).
28 There is a limited amount of scholarship which addresses patent disclosure
issues. See, e.g., Jeanne C. Fromer, Patent Disclosure, 94 IOWA L. REv. 539, 563-94
(2009) (proposing a two-layered patent document consisting of a technical layer and
a legal layer); Timothy R. Holbrook, Possession in Patent Law, 59 SMU L. REv. 123,
131-46 (2006) (arguing that disclosure plays a limited role in patent theory); Kathe-
rine J. Strandburg, Users as Innovators: Implications for Patent Doctrine, 79 U. COLo. L.
REv. 467, 485-88 (2008) (arguing that disclosure is not an issue when the invention is
self-disclosed through commercialization); The Disclosure Function of the Patent System,
supra note 17, at 2013-17 (contending that the patent system fails in its mission to
disseminate information).
29 See generally Sean B. Seymore, Heightened Enablement in the Unpredictable Arts, 56
UCLA L. REv. 127 (2008) (analyzing the enablement inquiry that is essential to the
disclosure requirement).
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I. IDENTIFYING THE PROBLEM
A. No Experimentation Required!
1. Constructive Reduction to Practice
In contrast to the norms of scientific research, which focus on
work actually performed, an inventor can obtain a patent without con-
ducting a single experiment.s0 It is well settled in U.S. patent law that
conception, 3 and not any physical act, is the key facet of the inventive
process. 32 Thus, an applicant who "constructively" reduces an inven-
tion to practice by merely filing a patent application presumably has
complied with the disclosure requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112, 3
including the obligation to enable a PHOSITA to make and use the
invention without undue experimentation. 34
Constructive reduction to practice plays a unique role in patent
law, as Judge Pauline Newman describes:
[It] is a legal status unique to the patent art. Unlike the rules
for scientific publications, which require actual performance of
every experimental detail, patent law and practice are directed to
teaching the invention so that it can be practiced. The inclusion of
constructed examples in a patent application is an established
method of providing the technical content needed to support the
conceived scope of the invention.35
30 See, e.g., Gould v. Quigg, 822 F.2d 1074, 1078 (Fed. Cir. 1987) ("'The mere fact
that something has not previously been done clearly is not, in itself, a sufficient basis
for rejecting all applications purporting to disclose how to do it.'" (quoting In re
Chilowsky, 229 F.2d 457, 461 (C.C.P.A. 1956))).
31 Conception, often referred to as the "touchstone" of inventorship, is the "for-
mation in the mind of the inventor, of a definite and permanent idea of the complete
and operative invention, as it is hereafter to be applied in practice." 1 RoBINsoN ON
PATENTS 532 (1890); see also Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 40 F.3d 1223,
1227-28 (Fed. Cir. 1994) ("Conception is 'the formation in the mind of the inventor
of a definite and permanent idea of the complete and operative invention . . . .'")
(quoting Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1376 (Fed.
Cir. 1986))).
32 See Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 60 (1998) (explaining that "the word
'invention' in the Patent Act unquestionably refers to the inventor's conception
rather than to a physical embodiment of that idea").
33 See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006).
34 Hybritech, 802 F.2d at 1376. Although the term "undue experimentation" does
not appear in the statute, "it is well established that enablement requires that the
specification teach those in the art to make and use the invention without undue
experimentation." In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
35 Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc. v. Promega Corp., 323 F.3d 1354, 1377 (Fed. Cir.
2003) (Newman, J., dissenting).
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Yet courts acknowledge that the doctrine is legal fiction.3 6 As
Professors Dan Burk and Mark Lemley have pointed out, the doctrine
recognizes that "the inventor is in some sense speculating or guessing
about the features of an invention not yet built."37 Nonetheless, "the
underlying assumption in patent law is that the inventor 'has' the
invention mentally, and so can give a sufficiently detailed description
of that inventive conception-[thus] physically creating the invention
is straightforward."38 This legal fiction probably emerged during the
early days of the patent system when inventions were simple and easy
to describe.39
Since the doctrine is legal fiction, it is not surprising that con-
structive reduction to practice has several inherent problems. First,
some inventions cannot be constructively reduced to practice because
they require confirmation through experiment. For example, it is
often true in chemistry and other "unpredictable" fields40 that a pat-
ent which lacks working examples merely invites the PHOSITA to
engage in extensive experimentation to figure out how to practice the
claimed invention. 41 Second, by not requiring that the inventor have
36 See, e.g., Elan Pharms., Inc. v. Mayo Found., 346 F.3d 1051, 1055 (Fed. Cir.
2003) ("'Even the act of publication or the fiction of constructive reduction to prac-
tice will not suffice if the disclosure [is inadequate].'" (quoting In re Borst, 345 F.2d
851, 855 (C.C.P.A. 1965))). Nonetheless, the Federal Circuit regularly reiterates that
constructive reduction to practice is an established method of disclosure, even in the
experimental sciences. See Falkner v. Inglis, 448 F.3d 1357, 1366-67 (Fed. Cir. 2006);
Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 358 F.3d 916, 926 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
37 Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-Specific, 17 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1155, 1174 n.77 (2002).
38 Id.
39 See William D. Noonan, Patenting Medical Technology, 11 J. LEGAL MED. 263,
264-69 (1990) (presenting a historical perspective of the patent system's bias toward
inventions in applied technologies like mechanical engineering).
40 The courts refer to the experimental sciences as "unpredictable" because
PHOSITAs in these fields often cannot predict if a reaction protocol that works for
one embodiment will work for others. See infra note 113 and accompanying text. On
the other hand, inventions in applied technologies like electrical and mechanical
engineering are often regarded as "predictable" arts because they are rooted in well-
defined, predictable factors. For a deeper exploration of the predictable-unpredict-
able dichotomy, see Seymore, supra note 29, at 136-54; Sean B. Seymore, The Enable-
ment Pendulum Swings Back, 6 Nw. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 278, 282-84 (2008).
41 See, e.g., In re Gardner, 427 F.2d 786, 789 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (determining that
applicant's disclosure, which lacked a single specific example or embodiment, fell
into the category of "an invitation to experiment" in order to determine how to make
use of the alleged invention). The U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
(C.C.P.A.) was a predecessor to the Federal Circuit. The Federal Courts Improve-
ment Act of 1982 abolished the C.C.P.A. See Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (1982)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). Soon after its creation, the
2010] 629
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a complete and operative invention actually reduced to practice at the
time of filing, the resulting patent will probably be too broad in scope.
Put another way, the patent will likely protect speculative ideas as
opposed to subject matter that is truly enabled.4 2 Third, the Patent
Office must presume that an invention constructively reduced to prac-
tice is enabled unless the examiner can prove otherwise.4 3 The exam-
iner bears this burden "even when there is no evidence in the record
of operability without undue experimentation."" Fourth, as the late
Judge Edward Smith wisely observed, "It is the details of how to make
and use an invention that are of value in the patent disclosure. Bare
ideas are not patentable." 4 5 He further explained:
Paper patents . .. eviscerate the value of patent disclosures because
they necessarily contain untested, speculative details. Paper patents
merely add to the clutter of unproved patents in the [Patent Office]
and in the courts, requiring fees, examinations, lawyers, trials and
appeals, all of which disserve both the inventing and the using
communities. 46
Finally, the disclosure of unproven ideas arguably adds little or noth-
ing to the public storehouse of knowledge. 4 7
Federal Circuit adopted the C.C.P.A. decisional law as binding precedent. See South
Corp. v. United States, 690 F.2d 1368, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1982) (en banc).
42 Christopher A. Harkins, Fending Off Paper Patents and Patent Trolls: A Novel "Cold
Fusion" Defense Because Changing Times Demand It, 17 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 407, 453
(2007).
43 See In re Epstein, 32 F.3d 1559, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (Plager, J., concurring);
In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1992); In re Marzocchi, 439 F.2d 220,
223-24 (C.C.P.A. 1971).
44 U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, MANUAL OF PATENT
EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2164.04 (8th ed. 2001, rev. 2008) [hereinafter MPEP], avail-
able at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/mpep.htm. The MPEP pro-
vides guidance to patent examiners. While the MPEP does not have the force of law,
it is entitled to judicial notice as the Patent Office's official interpretation of statutes
and regulations. Molins PLC v. Textron, Inc., 48 F.3d 1172, 1180 n.10 (Fed. Cir.
1995).
45 UMC Elecs. Co. v. United States, 816 F.2d 647, 664-65 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (Smith,
J., dissenting) (emphasis added), abrogated by Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55
(1998).
46 Id. at 665. A "paper patent" refers to a patent issued for an invention that has
not been actually reduced to practice. See In re Holladay, 584 F.2d 384, 386 (C.C.P.A.
1978).
47 See In re Argoudelis, 434 F.2d 1390, 1394 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (Baldwin, J., concur-
ring) (explaining that the full and complete disclosure of how to make and use the
claimed invention "adds a measure of worthwhile knowledge to the public store-
house"); cf Ad. Works v. Brady, 107 U.S. 192, 200 (1882) ("The design of the patent
laws is to reward those who make some substantial discovery or invention, which adds
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2. Prophetic Examples
Since a patentee's compliance with § 112 does not turn on the
presence or absence of working examples, 48 the courts allow inventors
to satisfy enablement in other ways. These include the use of pro-
phetic examples, which Professor Timothy Holbrook defines as "forms
of the invention that the patentee did not actually invent but which
would be within the scope of her disclosure."4 9 A patent supported
with prophetic examples does not necessarily raise any red flags with
respect to (non)enablement.50
Yet prophetic examples have several serious drawbacks. First,
they are often less helpful than working examples, particularly in the
experimental sciences. For example, in chemistry a PHOSITA often
cannot take a result from one reaction and predict how similar com-
pounds will react with any reasonable expectation of success.51 This is
true because minor changes in chemical structure can result in large
changes in reactivity.5 2 Second, the mere ability to write about an idea
or craft prophetic examples does not mean that the inventor necessa-
rily possesses the invention.53 Third, and relatedly, when the inventor
to our knowledge .... It was never the object of those laws to grant a monopoly for
every trifling device, every shadow of a shade of an idea . . . .").
48 See In re Borkowski, 422 F.2d 904, 908 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (explaining that there is
no statutory basis for a working example requirement); In re Long, 368 F.2d 892,
894-95 (C.C.P.A. 1966) (same).
49 Holbrook, supra note 28, at 158; see also MPEP, supra note 44, at § 608.01 (p)
(permitting the use of prophetic examples). The key benefit of prophetic examples is
their use in provisional patent applications, which allows an applicant to obtain an
early filing date for the invention before the applicant is ready to draft a claim or a
full application. See 35 U.S.C. § 111 (2006). But the provisional application must
include a written description which satisfies the requirements of § 112. See New Rail-
head Mfg., L.L.C. v. Vermeer Mfg. Co., 298 F.3d 1290, 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
50 See Atlas Powder Co. v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 750 F.2d 1569, 1577
(Fed. Cir. 1984). Patentees must set forth prophetic examples in the present tense to
signal that they were not carried out. Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 339
F.3d 1373, 1376 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (citing Atlas Powder, 750 F.2d at 1578).
51 See Seymore, supra note 29, at 144-46.
52 The courts recognized long ago that chemical compounds that are similar in
structure can differ radically in their properties, even when they belong to the same
chemical class. If an applicant seeks to claim the class, "it must appear in the [written
description] ... that the chemicals or chemical combinations included therein [are]
generally capable of accomplishing the desired result." In re Walker, 70 F.2d 1008,
1011 (C.C.P.A. 1934) (internal quotation marks omitted).
53 The "written description" requirement of § 112 ensures that the applicant was
in possession of the invention as of the filing date. See Capon v. Eshhar, 418 F.3d
1349, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (noting that the written description requirement "serves
both to satisfy the inventor's obligation to disclose the technologic knowledge upon
which the patent is based, and to demonstrate that the patentee was in possession of
6312010]
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discloses prophetic examples and no more, there is a real danger that
the claimed embodiments cannot be made or that the invention will
not work.54 This, in turn, may frustrate the efforts of other research-
ers who seek to actually create the prophetically claimed invention or
to improve upon it.66
In the end, a disclosure regime which does not require actual
experimentation all too often produces patent documents which have
little, if any, technical value. And, as discussed below, patents are
often filled with repetitive, incomprehensible language, which further
explains why many innovators avoid reading the patent literature
altogether.
the invention that is claimed"); Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563-64
(Fed. Cir. 1991) (explaining that the written description must convey with "reasona-
ble clarity" to the PHOSITA that the applicant possessed the claimed invention as of
the filing date sought). An actual reduction to practice is one way to show possession.
See Guidelines for Examination of Patent Applications Under the 35 U.S.C. 112, 1 1,
"Written Description" Requirement, 66 Fed. Reg. 1099, 1105 (Jan. 5, 2001); see also
Lockwood v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 107 F.3d 1565, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (listing addi-
tional ways to show possession). As with enablement, compliance with the written
description requirement does not turn on the use of prophetic examples. See, e.g.,
Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 560 F.3d 1366, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2009) ("Prophetic
examples are routinely used in the chemical arts, and they certainly can be sufficient
to satisfy the written description requirement."), vacated, 2009 WL 2573004 (Fed. Cir.
Aug. 21, 2009).
54 According to the Federal Circuit, claims are not necessarily invalid if they
encompass inoperative embodiments because "'[i]t is not a function of the claims to
specifically exclude . . . possible inoperative substances."' Atlas Powder, 750 F.2d at
1576 (quoting In re Dinh-Nguyen, 492 F.2d 856, 858-59 (C.C.P.A. 1974)). But, "if the
number of inoperative [embodiments] becomes significant, and in effect forces [a
PHOSITA] to experiment unduly in order to practice the claimed invention, the
claims might indeed be invalid." Id. at 1576-77; see also Durel Corp. v. Osram Sylvania
Inc., 256 F.3d 1298, 1306-07 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (determining that if the accused
infringer shows that a "significant percentage" of embodiments encompassed by the
claims are inoperable, that might be sufficient to prove invalidity).
55 Harkins, supra note 42, at 453; Holbrook, supra note 28, at 158. To make mat-
ters worse, the prophetic examples themselves can be asserted as prior art against
future inventors. See Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d 1313,
1355 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ("In patent prosecution the examiner is entitled to reject appli-
cation claims as anticipated by a prior art patent without conducting an inquiry into
whether or not [the subject matter disclosed in the] patent is enabled . . . .");
Seymore, supra note 29, at 145; see also discussion infra Part III.A (discussing the draw-
backs of undue patent scope on ex post improvement activity).
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B. "Patentese"
1. What Is It?
Patent drafting is an art.5 6 After working with the inventor to fig-
ure out what the invention is, the patent application drafter faces the
formidable task of putting the invention into words.57 Aside from
crafting claims that will be easily infringed,'5 8 the drafter must craft a
written description59 that will enable and inform the meaning of the
claim scope sought.60 A crucial step in this process is transforming
the inventor's plain English into patentese, the specialized language
56 See, e.g., Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534 (1966) (referring to drafting as
a "highly developed art"). Only registered patent attorneys and agents may draft pat-
ent applications. See Changes to Representation of Others Before the United States
Patent and Trademark Office, 73 Fed. Reg. 47,650 (Aug. 14, 2008) (to be codified at
37 C.F.R. pt. 11).
57 The Supreme Court has recognized the difficulty of transforming an invention
into words:
"An invention exists most importantly as a tangible structure or a series of
drawings. A verbal portrayal is usually an afterthought written to satisfy the
requirements of patent law. This conversion of machine to words allows for
unintended idea gaps which cannot be satisfactorily filled. Often the inven-
tion is novel and words do not exist to describe it. ... Things are not made
for the sake of words, but words for things."
Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 731 (2002)
(quoting Autogiro Co. of Am. v. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 397 (Ct. Cl. 1967)).
58 Claims are of little value unless they can ensnare or deter a potential infringer.
Patentees achieve this goal by obtaining broad claims which cover "all expected and
unanticipated [variants] that competitors and others may later develop and all inten-
tional and unintentional copies of the claimed invention which embody the inven-
tor's concept." ROBERT C. FABER, LANDIS ON MECHANICS OF PATENT CLAIM DRAFTING
§ 10:1.1 (5th ed. 2006). Thus, the claims must cover not only competing products
envisioned at the time of filing, but also competing products that the patentee could
barely imagine which employ the concept of the invention. See id.; George F.
Wheeler, Creative Claim Drafting: Claim Drafting Strategies, Specification Preparation, and
Prosecution Tactics, 3J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 34, 38-40 (2003).
59 The written description is the part of the patent (or patent application) that
completely describes the invention. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006) ("The specification
shall contain a written description. . . . It shall conclude with one or more
claims . . . ."). Although I will not do so in this Article, it is worth noting that the
terms "written description" and "specification" are often used interchangeably (and
mistakenly) in patent law. DONALD S. CHISUM ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 156
n.4 (3d ed. 2004).
60 It is a bedrock principle of patent law that claims are construed in light of the
written description. See Seymour v. Osborne, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 516, 547 (1870);
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 979-81 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en
banc), affd, 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
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that patents are written in.61 This transformation, whether deliber-
ately or not,6 2 leads many applicants to fall short of fulfilling the statu-
tory mandate to provide a written description using "full, clear,
concise, and exact terms."6 3 For example, on an occasion when the
late Judge Giles S. Rich had to parse through a chemical patent appli-
cation, he explained that the patentese-laden phrase "an alcohol hav-
ing at least one hydrogen atom attached to the carbon atom bearing
the hydroxyl substituent to the corresponding carbonyl compound"
meant, in plain English, "a primary or secondary alcohol."6 4
2. Why Is It Used?
First, patentese stretches the disclosure. In crafting the written
description of the invention, the drafter must provide enough infor-
mation to adequately enable the claims, which cannot be any broader
than the disclosure.6 5 The test is whether the enablement provided in
the disclosure is commensurate in scope with the protection sought by
the claims. 66 And, consistent with the doctrine of constructive reduc-
61 Although patentese often appears throughout the patent document, this Arti-
cle focuses on its use in the written description.
62 See Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534 (1966) (explaining that the patentee
has an incentive to withhold information, which can be achieved through "the highly
developed art of drafting patent [documents] so that they disclose as little useful
information as possible."); WILLIAM D. NoRDHAus, INVENTION, GROWTH, AND WELFARE
89 (1969) ("It is well known that a firm tries not to disclose key parts of the invention
in order to reduce the chance of imitation, thereby reducing the effective diffusion of
knowledge."); see also Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive
Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1017, 1029 & n.52 (1989) (suggesting
that many published patents are of little use to others as a result of information sup-
pression); Robin Feldman, Plain Language Patents, 17 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 289,
291-92 (2009) ("Jargon is also the perfect vehicle for strategic behavior. It allows
legal actors to use broad open-ended language and then argue later that whatever
position they wish surely falls within the language chosen.").
63 See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006).
64 In re Sarett, 327 F.2d 1005, 1006 (C.C.P.A. 1964).
65 O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 113 (1854); Nat'l Recovery Techs.,
Inc. v. Magnetic Separation Sys., Inc., 166 F.3d 1190, 1196 (Fed. Cir. 1999); see also In
re Hyatt, 708 F.2d 712, 714 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (emphasizing that § 112 requires that "the
enabling disclosure . . . be commensurate in scope with the claim under
consideration").
66 See In re Moore, 439 F.2d 1232, 1236 (C.C.P.A. 1971) (referring to this test as
the relevant enablement inquiry); cases cited supra note 65. The scope of enable-
ment is the sum of what is taught in the written description plus what is known by a
PHOSITA without undue experimentation. Nat'lRecovery Techs., 166 F.3d at 1196. As
I discuss below, one result of the proposal might be a shift toward narrower claiming.
In other words, there will likely be a closer correspondence between the disclosed
embodiments and the claim scope sought. For example, applicants in the chemical
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tion to practice, courts allow the patentee to provide enablement
either through illustrative examples or broad terminology.6 7 An
excerpt from a recently issued patent provides an example of the
latter:
Further aspects of the invention will become apparent from
consideration of the drawings and the ensuing description of pre-
ferred embodiments of the invention. A person skilled in the art
will realize that other embodiments of the invention are possible
and that the details of the invention can be modified in a number
of respects, all without departing from the inventive concept. Thus,
the following drawings and description are to be regarded as illus-
trative in nature and not restrictive.6 8
In sum, an inventor who does very little can employ boilerplate
patentese to help cast the invention in broad terms.
Second, and relatedly, patentese preserves claim scope. It allows
the patentee to avoid poor word choices, which can disavow subject
matter that otherwise would fall within the scope of the claims.69 Per-
haps in an effort to elucidate the inventor's true intention, the Fed-
eral Circuit has identified several linguistic pitfalls that the patentee
must evade in order to avoid a narrow claim construction. 70 These
pitfalls include language which explicitly or implicitly identifies essen-
tial aspects of the invention,7 1 imperatively describes the invention
arts will be less inclined to draft claims encompassing millions or billions of com-
pounds because it is unlikely that the disclosure will include enough working exam-
ples to enable claims of that breadth. See Seymore, supra note 40, at 292.
67 See In re Wright, 999 F.2d 1557, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
68 U.S. Patent No. 7,249,538 col. 2 11. 62-70 (filed Aug. 16, 2005).
69 See Watts v. XL Sys., Inc., 232 F.3d 877, 882 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (explaining that
one purpose of examining the written description is to determine if the patentee has
limited the scope of the claims). In addition, patentees must be mindful of the disclo-
sure-dedication rule. See discussion infra Part IlI.C.
70 See, e.g., Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc)
(describing instances where the court interprets a claim more narrowly than it other-
wise would to give effect to the inventor's intent to disavow a broader claim scope).
71 See, e.g., Vehicular Techs. Corp. v. Titan Wheel Int'l, Inc., 212 F.3d 1377,
1380-82 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (affirming summary judgment of noninfringement);
Tronzo v. Biomet, Inc., 156 F.3d 1154, 1159 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (determining that a
written description which recited that "[an] extremely important aspect of the pre-
sent device resides in the configuration of the acetabular cup as a trapezoid or a
portion of a truncated cone" only supported conical shaped cups and not the broad
cup shape recited in the claims) (quoting U.S. Patent No. 4,681,589 col. 3 1. 63 (filed
June 1, 1984)); Vehicular Techs. Corp. v. Titan Wheel Int'l, Inc., 141 F.3d 1084,
1090-91 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (holding that if the written description clearly emphasizes
the importance of a specific function, and the accused device is incapable of perform-
ing that function, then there can be no infringement); Gentry Gallery, Inc. v.
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with so-called "patent profanity," 2 distinguishes the invention from
the prior art,7 3 or discusses the exact problem that the invention
solves.74 Even an overly concise title for the patent can cause
problems.75 Thus, patentees inundate every facet of the patent docu-
ment with patentese to avoid these pitfalls.76
Berkline Corp., 134 F.3d 1473, 1479 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (determining that a written
description indicating the central location of controls and lacking any variation of
their position implicitly indicated that the central location was essential).
72 Specific examples include words like "critical," "superior," "preferably," "must,"
"important," "peculiar," and "significant." See Bayer AG v. Elan Pharm. Research
Corp., 212 F.3d 1241, 1252-54 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (collecting cases and providing exam-
ples of words that serve as a clear and unmistakable surrender of subject matter). For
a detailed exploration of "patent profanity," see Allen R. Jensen & Stacy D. Lewis,
Patent Profanity: Watch Your Mouth!, PAT. WORLD, Feb. 2002.
73 See, e.g., Inpro II Licensing, S.A.R.L. v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 450 F.3d 1350,
1356-57 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (affirming the district court's narrow construction of the
term "host interface" in a claim directed to a PDA device); Astrazeneca AB v. Mutual
Pharm. Co., 384 F.3d 1333, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (explaining that when the written
description describes a feature of the invention and criticizes other products that lack
that same feature, this operates as a clear disavowal of the other products and
processes using these products); SciMed Life Sys., Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular
Sys., Inc., 242 F.3d 1337, 1344-45 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (affirming a district court's narrow
claim construction because the written description specifically identified and criti-
cized the prior art device, thereby disclaiming the subject matter); Ekchian v. Home
Depot, Inc., 104 F.3d 1299, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (noting that characterizing the
invention over the prior art often, by implication, indicates what the claims do not
cover and, therefore, surrenders protection).
74 See, e.g., J & M Corp. v. Harley-Davidson, Inc., 269 F.3d 1360, 1362-68 (Fed.
Cir. 2001) (determining that patentee's statements in the written description that the
claimed invention avoided problems of the prior art served as a disclaimer of subject
matter).
75 On one hand, the patent rules say that the title of the invention "must be as
short and specific as possible." 37 C.F.R. § 1.72 (2009). Nonetheless, in Exxon Chemi-
cal Patents, Inc. v. Lubrizol Corp., 64 F.3d 1553 (Fed. Cir. 1995), the Federal Circuit
used the patent's title, "Lubricating Oil Compositions Containing Ashless Dispersant,
[ZDDP], Metal Detergent and a Copper Compound," to support its holding that the
claim should cover a specific product with particularly defined ingredients. See id. at
1557-58. A few years later, ChiefJudge Michel attempted, at great lengths, to confine
Exxon to its facts. See Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 182 F.3d 1298,
1312-13 (Fed. Cir. 1999). Not surprisingly, the patent bar remains cautious. See 1
IRAH H. DONNER, PATENT PROSECUTION § 1.V (5th ed. 2007).
76 See The Disclosure Function of the Patent System, supra note 17, at 2014-28. Not-
withstanding the disclosure requirements of § 112, many patentees adopt the view
that the written description does not define the invention but rather provides exam-
ples or embodiments of the invention. For instance, rather than using language
which explicitly describes what "the invention" is, a savvy drafter would say something
like: "In an embodiment, one aspect of the invention relates to . . . ." See Wheeler,
supra note 58, at 43.
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Third, patentese is, at least in part, an artifact of peripheral claim-
ing. Until the Patent Act of 1870,77 the U.S. patent system followed a
central claiming regime in which the specific examples given in the
written description served as the principal measure of claim scope. 8
Under the peripheral system, claim language sets forth the metes and
bounds of the invention, like a deed to real property.79 Thus, lan-
guage now lies at the top of the hierarchy for determining claim
scope. As a result, patentees have "develop [ed] various claim drafting
schemes so as to maximize the breadth of a claim based on certain
illustrative, or sometimes a modicum of, disclosure provided in the
[written description] ."s Professor Carl Moy explained that the inher-
ent indeterminacy of language compounds this problem:
77 Ch. 230, § 26, 16 Stat. 198, 201 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 171
(2006))
78 In central claiming, there is a close correlation between the working embodi-
ments disclosed and the embodiments that are claimed. See Alan L. Durham, Patent
Symmetry, 87 B.U. L. REV. 969, 982 (2007); C. Leon Kim, Transition from Central to
Peripheral Definition Patent Claim Interpretation System in Korea, 77 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK
OFF. Soc'Y 401, 402-03 (1995) (describing the central claiming regime); Toshiko
Takenaka, Doctrine of Equivalents After Hilton Davis: A Comparative Law Analysis, 22
RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 479, 503 (1996) (noting that under the central
claiming regime, the claim merely identified examples of the invention). So, in con-
trast to peripheral claiming, central claiming "requires that the scope of the patent
protection be determined by defining the principle forming the inventive idea or
solution underlying the claim language." 17 TOSHIKo TAKENAKA, INTERPRETING PAT-
ENT CLAIMS: THE UNITED STATES, GERMANY AND JAPAN 3 (1995). When the patent is
enforced, the "[c]ourts use the wording of the claims as a guideline to determine the
scope of protection, but are not strictly bound by claim limitations." Id.
79 The 1870 Act introduced the requirement to "particularly point out and dis-
tinctly claim the part . . . which [the applicant] claims." Patent Act of 1870 § 26, 16
Stat. at 201; see also Corning Glass Works v. Sumitomo Elec. U.S.A., Inc., 868 F.2d
1251, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (explaining that the claim provides the metes and bounds
of the patentee's right to exclude). For an in-depth discussion of the transition from
central to peripheral claiming, see Ex Parte Fressola, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d 1608, 1609-11
(B.P.A.I. 1993).
80 Kim, supra note 78, at 404; see also Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Quantum
Patent Mechanics, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 29, 53-54 (2005) (discussing the shortcom-
ings of peripheral claiming); Clarisa Long, Information Costs in Patent and Copyright, 90
VA. L. REV. 465, 542 & n.187 (2004) (recognizing that applicants deliberately build
ambiguity into the patent document); Douglas R. Nemec & Emily J. Zelenock,
Rethinking the Role of the Written Description Requirement in Claim Construction: Whatever
Happened to "Possession is Nine-Tenths of the Law?," 8 MINN. J. L. Sci. & TECH. 357, 406
(2007) (contending that in spite of the statutory mandate that a patentee's exclusive
rights extend only to the clearly described subject matter of his claim, "current claim
construction practice allows the patentee to unfairly benefit from incomplete,
unclear, and imprecise descriptions of its own invention since such descriptions are
less likely to be construed to represent unequivocal narrowing language").
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Peripheral claiming equates the scope of the patent right with the
lingual meaning of the words in the patent claim. It does not
include any direct reference to the scope of the patent disclosure.
Accordingly, peripheral claiming provides the patentee with a much
more powerful means of defining the invention . . . . In addition,
peripheral claiming imposes no inherent limit on the level of
abstraction that the patentee is able to use in the claim.8 '
Given this incentive, and recognizing that the courts will not invali-
date claims for indefiniteness unless they are "insolubly ambiguous," 8 2
patentees intentionally draft ambiguous claims in an effort to expand
their patent rights as far as possible.8 3
3. Drawbacks
While applicants view patentese as an invaluable tool for protect-
ing claim scope, it has drawbacks. First, patentese obscures the inven-
tion. An interested reader must parse through the broad terminology
81 R. Carl Moy, Subjecting Rembrandt to the Rule of Law: Rule-Based Solutions for Deter-
mining the Patentability ofBusiness Methods, 28 Wm. MITCHELL L. REV. 1047, 1082 (2002)
(internal citations omitted); cf Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co.,
535 U.S. 722, 731 (2002) ("Unfortunately, the nature of language makes it impossible
to capture the essence of a thing in a patent application. The inventor who chooses
to patent an invention and disclose it to the public, rather than exploit it in secret,
bears the risk that others will devote their efforts toward exploiting the limits of the
patent's language . . . .").
82 See Exxon Research & Eng'g Co. v. United States, 265 F.3d 1371, 1375 (Fed.
Cir. 2001). Several commentators have criticized this weak standard. See Michael J.
Meurer & Craig Allen Nard, Invention, Refinement and Patent Claim Scope: A New Perspec-
tive on the Doctrine ofEquivalents, 93 GEO. L.J. 1947, 1975-78 (2005) (exploring drafting
strategies that preserve claim scope); Samson Vermont, Taming the Doctrine of
Equivalents in Light of Patent Failure, 16J. INTELL. PROP. L. 83, 85 (2008) (arguing that
the standard should be changed to "something along the lines of 'not particular and
distinct."' (quoting Honeywell Int'l, Inc. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 341 F.3d 1332, 1340
(Fed. Cir. 2003)).
83 See The Disclosure Function of the Patent System, supra note 17, at 2025-26. As a
normative matter, this claiming practice runs afoul of the definiteness requirement of
§ 112, whose primary purpose is to provide notice to others and "to guard against
unreasonable advantages to the patentee and disadvantages to others arising from
uncertainty as to their [respective] rights." Gen. Elec. Co. v. Wabash Appliance Corp.,
304 U.S. 364, 369 (1938). If the ambiguous claim has at least two reasonable mean-
ings, the court may choose to adopt a narrow meaning, which is unfavorable to the
patentee. See Athletic Alternatives, Inc. v. Prince Mfg., Inc., 73 F.3d 1573, 1581 (Fed.
Cir. 1996). If the language is unintelligible, the court may invalidate the claim under
§ 112. See Craig Allen Nard, A Theory of Claim Interpretation, 14 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 1,
81 (2000) (citing Athletic Alternatives, 73 F.3d at 1583 (Nies, J., concurring)). But
"[n]o matter the choice, the result is a sanction against the patentee, and, hopefully, a
deterrent against poor claim drafting." Id.
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and jargon to figure out both what the inventor actually did and
intended to encompass by the claims. From a teaching standpoint,
someone who wants to understand the invention must hope that the
inventor discloses the information through another source, like a
technical journal.84
Second, patentees use patentese to sidestep enablement. Since
the courts allow the patentee to provide enablement with "broad ter-
minology,"85 an inventor has little incentive to actually reduce an
invention to practice before filing a patent application. In addition,
any doubts about enablement are resolved in the patentee's favor,
both in patent prosecution8 6 and litigation. 7 As a result, some paten-
tees deliberately suppress crucial information or purposely craft docu-
ments that are hard to understand.8
Third, patentese creates problems in the courtroom.89 Many
judges dread patent cases.90 Litigators contend that patent jury ver-
84 See Holbrook, supra note 28, at 146 (explaining that patents may even
encourage disclosure through pre-patent disclosures and publications).
85 See In re Wright, 999 F.2d 1557, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
86 During prosecution, the examiner must prove nonenablement because the dis-
closure is presumed sufficient. In re Marzocchi, 439 F.2d 220, 224 (C.C.P.A. 1971)
("[I]t is incumbent upon the Patent Office, whenever [an enablement] rejection ...
is made, to explain why it doubts the truth or accuracy of any statement in a support-
ing disclosure and to back up assertions of its own with acceptable evidence or reason-
ing which is inconsistent with the contested statement."); see also In re Budnick, 537
F.2d 535, 537 (C.C.P.A. 1976) ("Where an applicant asserts that a specification [is
enabled] ... but the examiner is of the opinion that the disclosure is nonenabling, he
has the burden of substantiating his doubts concerning enablement with reasons or
evidence.").
87 Since an issued patent is presumed valid, see 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2006), the chal-
lenger must prove nonenablement by clear and convincing evidence. See Morton
Int'l, Inc. v. Cardinal Chem. Co., 5 F.3d 1464, 1470 (Fed. Cir. 1993). In addition, the
presumption of validity remains intact and the burden of proof remains on the chal-
lenger throughout the litigation, and the clear and convincing standard does not
change. See Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1375 (Fed.
Cir. 1986).
88 See supra note 62.
89 As the late Chief Judge Helen Nies once pointed out, "We have made the
infringement analysis so convoluted [that] it is impossible for most district court
judges untrained in 'patentese' to follow, much less jurors." Hilton Davis Chem. Co.
v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (Nies, J., dissenting),
rev'd sub nom. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997).
For a trial judge's perspective, see Rexnord, Inc. v. Laitram Corp., 628 F. Supp. 467,
473 (E.D. Wis. 1986) (admitting that while the court has expertise in discovering
truth based on the actions of litigants, "its expertise in ascertaining truth from techni-
cal patent documents is not as glowing").
90 See A Panel Discussion: Claim Construction from the Perspective of theDistrictJudge, 54
CASE W. RES. L. REv. 671, 682 (2004) ("I have heard trial judges claim that they dislike
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dicts are unpredictable because jurors find the cases too hard to
understand.9 1 Although several commentators suggest that the bane
of patent litigation for both judges and jurors is the technical nature
of the subject matter,92 the heart of the problem might actually be
patentese. As a judge once explained:
Judges trained in the law are confronted with baffling devices apply-
ing esoteric principles of all branches of higher mathematics and
science.... [T] he patent bar, with its generally high state of profes-
sional competence and extraordinary thoroughness in preparation,
has found helpful ways to make the judges' task manageable and
intelligible.... [But] to the problem of understanding the substan-
tive nature of the patented device or method may be added the
further, if not more basic, one of communication: just what do
these words-often a long, prolix combination . . . mean?9 3
patent litigation, partly because it is hard. Patent litigation is like the neurosurgery of
litigation: it is hard scientifically and it is hard legally.") (statement of Judge Patti
Saris); Janice M. Mueller, Crafting Patents For The Twenty-First Century: Maximize Patent
Strength and Avoid Prosecution History Estoppel in a Post-Markman/Hilton Davis World, 79
J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'v 499, 503 (1997) (presenting several reasons for the
judicial dislike of patent cases); Edited & Excerpted Transcript of the Symposium on Ideas
Into Action: Implementing Reform of the Patent System, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1053,
1108-09 (2004) (statement of Lynn Pasahow) (describing how some judges hate to
hear patent cases and try to devote as little time to them as possible).
91 See, e.g., ADVISORY COMM'N ON PATENT LAW REFORM, A REPORT TO THE SECRE-
TARY OF COMMERCE 107-10 (1992) (exploring arguments for and against jury trials in
patent cases); Kimberly A. Moore, jury Demands: Who's Asking?, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
847, 852 (2002) ("Ifjuries are unable to understand the technology or apply the law,
their decisions will be based on less meritorious influences such as bias, likeability, or
emotion."); Philippe Signore, On the Role ofJuries in Patent Litigation (Part 1), 83J. PAT.
& TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'v 791, 824-29 (2001) (discussing juror competence in patent
cases). For a trial judge's perspective, see judicial Panel Discussion on Science and the
Law, 25 CONN. L. REv. 1127, 1145 (1993) ("Honest to God, I don't see how you could
try a patent matter to a jury. Goodness, I've gotten involved in a few of these things.
It's like somebody hit you between your eyes with a four-by-four. It's factually so com-
plicated." (statement of Judge Alfred V. Covello)).
92 See generally Jack E. Brown, The Advantages and Disadvantages ofJuries in Techni-
cal Cases, 9 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 403 (1993) (arguing that juries
are capable of handling complex, technical cases, and suggesting procedural
improvements); Kimberly A. Moore, judges, juries, and Patent Cases-An Empirical Peek
Inside the Black Box, 99 MICH. L. REv. 365 (2000) (using empirical data to assess the
relative competitiveness of judges and juries in patent cases); Arti K. Rai, Specialized
Trial Courts: Concentrating Expertise on Fact, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 877 (2002) (advocat-
ing for the creation of a patent trial court).
93 Thermo King Corp. v. White's Trucking Serv., Inc., 292 F.2d 668, 675 (5th Cir.
1961). Although the judge was commenting on claim language, his remarks are also
applicable to the language in the written description.
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Stripping away the patentese would allow the judge to see the legal
issues involved and help the factfinder better understand the
technology.94
II. IMPROVING THE TEACHING FUNCTION OF PATENTS
A. Imposing a Working Example Requirement
1. Raising the Standard of Disclosure
It is axiomatic that the best way to teach a technical subject is with
real examples.95 This is why working examples and descriptions of
work actually performed pervade science journals and other forms of
technical literature.96 If patents are to compete with these informa-
tion sources, then they must provide the same quality of teaching. For
this to happen, two things must occur. First, at least for complex
inventions, an actual reduction to practice must become the standard
of disclosure. In brief, this would require that an inventor prove,
through adequate detail in the written description, that the claimed
invention has been constructed and works for its intended purpose.97
Second, applicants must be allowed to fulfill the statutory mandate of
drafting the written description using "full, clear, concise, and exact
terms" without the fear of a potentially narrow claim construction."
Adopting these changes would establish a regime in which appli-
cants seeking a patent for a complex invention could no longer rely
on broad terminology or prophetic examples to satisfy enablement
because the scope of the claim would be inherently limited by the
working examples provided.99 Put more simply, working examples
would supersede language in fixing claim scope. 00 Yet, in litigation,
the patentee could rely on the doctrine of equivalents' 0 to obtain
94 Cf Aghnides v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 335 F. Supp. 370, 379 (D.C. Md. 1971)
("[I]t is ... beneficial in patent cases to strip away the shroud ofjargon ... in order to
see the legal issues involved."), aff'd mem., 475 F.2d 1399 (4th Cir. 1973).
95 See, e.g., George Gore, On Practical Scientific Instruction, 7 Q. J. Sc. 215, 228
(1870) (asserting that one who teaches a technical subject must teach with examples
which should be full of practical applications and familiar illustrations).
96 See generally VERNON BOOTH, COMMUNICATING IN SCIENCE (2d ed. 1993) (com-
municating the importance of science writing); ROBERT A. DAY & BARBARA GASTEL,
How TO WRITE AND PUBLISH A SCIENTIFIC PAPER (6th ed. 2006) (same).
97 Mazzari v. Rogan, 323 F.3d 1000, 1005 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (citing Cooper v. Gold-
farb, 154 F.3d 1321, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
98 See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006); discussion supra Part I.B.2.
99 See Moy, supra note 81, at 1081.
100 See discussion supra Part I.B.2 (discussing the current disclosure regime).
101 A patent holder can prove infringement in either of two ways: by demonstrat-
ing that every element of a claim (1) is literally infringed or (2) is infringed under the
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coverage for variations beyond those specifically described in the writ-
ten description that embody the inventive idea. 102 By eliminating the
need or incentive for patentese, opaque language would quickly disap-
pear from the written description. The end result would be a reada-
ble and substantively useful patent document.
2. A New Examination Protocol
As an initial matter, the examiner should have the authority to
request working examples. This would be akin to, but different from,
the Patent Office's ability (albeit rarely used) to request a working
model of an invention. 103 The examiner would make this request if it
appears that the written description as filed provides inadequate
teaching to enable a PHOSITA to understand and carry out the full
judicially created doctrine of equivalents (DOE). Literal infringement requires that
the accused product or process falls precisely within the terms of the asserted patent
claim. See Engel Indus., Inc. v. Lockformer Co., 96 F.3d 1398, 1405 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
The DOE recognizes that in order to adequately protect a patentee, sometimes it is
appropriate to extend the right to exclude beyond the literal boundaries of the claim.
See Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 609 (1950). Thus,
the DOE allows a patentee "to claim those insubstantial alterations that were not cap-
tured in drafting the original patent claim but which could be created through trivial
changes." Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 733
(2002).
102 The DOE emerged under the central claiming regime. See Winans v. Den-
mead, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330, 342 (1854) (explaining that a patentee intends to claim
not only the precise embodiment disclosed, but other forms which embody the inven-
tion); TAKENAKA, supra note 78, at 9-10.
103 The patent statute permits the examiner to request a working model of an
invention. See 35 U.S.C. § 114 (2006) ("The Director may require the applicant to
furnish a model of convenient size to exhibit advantageously the several parts of his
invention."). In cases where the invention involves a composition of matter, the
Director "may require the applicant to furnish specimens or ingredients for the pur-
pose of inspection or experiment." Id. Curiously, the Patent Act of 1836, ch. 356, § 6,
5 Stat. 117 (amended 1839), required applicants to submit models at the time of
filing. See also In re Breslow, 616 F.2d 516, 522 (C.C.P.A. 1980) (recounting the history
of the requirement). The Patent Act of 1870 made the submission of models discre-
tionary. See Patent Act of 1870 §§ 28-29, ch. 230, §§ 28-29, 16 Stat. 198; In re Breslow,
616 F.2d at 522. In practice, the examiner only requests a working model in extreme
cases where an invention defies fundamental laws of science and inoperativeness is
incredibly clear. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.91(b); MPEP, supra note 44, § 608.03. For specific
examples, see generally Newman v. Quigg, 877 F.2d 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (perpetual
motion machine); Patently-O, http://patentlyo.com/patent/2006/02/
pto-requests-mo.html (Feb. 19, 2006, 05:58 CST) (discussing the file history for the
Worsley-Twist warp drive, U.S. Patent No. 182,373 (filed Oct. 25, 2002) (abandoned
Jul. 20, 2006)). Although this proposal does not go as far as § 114, it is similar in that
it too requires an actual reduction to practice. More importantly, a working example
requirement probably falls within the Patent Office's statutory authority.
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scope of the claimed invention without undue experimentation. 10 4 In
response, under the new protocol, the applicant could amend the
written description to include working examples.10 5 Upon receiving
the amendment, the examiner would determine "whether the mate-
rial added by [the] amendment was inherently contained in the origi-
nal application."1 0 6 If so, the examiner would enter the amendment
and proceed with prosecution.107
On the other hand, the applicant could determine that it is too
difficult or impossible to actually reduce all or parts of the invention
to practice. If this happens, the applicant could voluntarily decide to
either make a narrowing claim amendment or to abandon the appli-
cation altogether.108
Even if real examples provide the best form of teaching, the new
examination protocol would recognize that an applicant needs to pro-
vide them only when the invention's nature or complexity so
104 Cf Genentech, Inc. v. Novo Nordisk, A/S, 108 F.3d 1361, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 1997)
("[R]easonable detail must be provided in order to enable members of the public to
understand and carry out the invention."); discussion infra Part II.B.
105 This would, of course, require the Federal Circuit and the Patent Office to
adopt a more flexible view of what constitutes "new matter." To elaborate, when an
applicant amends the written description, the Patent Office instructs examiners to be
on the alert for "new matter." See 35 U.S.C. § 132(a) (2006) ("No amendment shall
introduce new matter into the disclosure of the invention."); 37 C.F.R. § 1.121; MPEP,
supra note 44, § 706.03(o) (alerting examiners). The new matter prohibition of 35
U.S.C. § 132 and its corollary, the written description requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112,
"both serve to ensure that the patent applicant was in full possession of the claimed
subject matter on the application filing date." TurboCare Div. of Demag Delaval
Turbomachinery Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 264 F.3d 1111, 1118 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
106 Schering Corp. v. Amgen Inc., 222 F.3d 1347, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2000); accord
TurboCare, 264 F.3d at 1118. Exactly what constitutes new matter must be determined
on a case-by-case basis. In re Oda, 443 F.2d 1200, 1203 (C.C.P.A. 1971).
107 One might ask if the amendment would unfairly give the applicant a "second
bite at the apple" with respect to compliance with § 112. See In re Hogan, 559 F.2d
595, 604 (C.C.P.A. 1977) (explaining that compliance with enablement is gauged as
of the applicant's effective filing date). Possibly, but as discussed in the main text, this
examination protocol is designed to strike a balance between early disclosure and the
need to transform the patent into a substantive technical document which can itself
promote innovation. See infra Part III.A. If anything, allowing the amendment would
yield claims that are certainly narrower than those that would likely issue under the
current regime because the added working examples themselves will further con-
strain claim scope. See discussion supra Part II.A.1; supra note 42 and accompanying
text.
108 This may ultimately lead to narrower claiming and, possibly, to patenting strat-
egies which involve prosecuting smaller, discrete applications. See Seymore, supra
note 40, at 290 (suggesting that a series of recent Federal Circuit enablement cases
may induce this result).
2010] 643
HeinOnline  -- 85 Notre Dame L. Rev. 643 2009-2010
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
demands. In other words, an actual reduction to practice would be
unnecessary when doing so would be trivial, or the potential teaching
or technical value would be slight. This is particularly true for simple,
mechanical inventions rooted in well-defined, "predictable" factors.109
A good example is a broom-rake. o10 Since a PHOSITA in the field of
harvesting can typically predict the effectiveness of the tool based on
the number of teeth and the gap between them,1"' a PHOSITA can
likely make and use a broom-rake with a minimal amount of teach-
ing.112 Thus, the examiner probably would not request a working
example. This result is entirely consistent with the teaching function:
if an innovator in the field of harvesting were to turn to the patent
literature at all, the substantive technical value of the disclosure prob-
ably would not depend on whether the rake was actually reduced to
practice.
At the other end of the spectrum are inventions in the experi-
mental sciences. In contrast to the mechanical arts, results in these
fields are often unpredictable because researchers often must engage
in trial and error to figure out what works and what does not. 13
109 See In re Vaeck, 947 F.2d 488, 496 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (noting that the requisite
level of disclosure for an invention involving a "predictable" factor such as a mechani-
cal or electrical element is less than that required for the unpredictable arts).
110 See U.S. Patent No. 3,078,652 (filed Sept. 1, 1961).
111 See generally R. A. KEPNER ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF FARM MACHINERY (3d ed. 1978)
(discussing agricultural machinery).
112 Cf Slip Track Sys., Inc. v. Metal-Lite, Inc., 304 F.3d 1256, 1265 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
(recognizing that proof that an invention works for its intended purpose is not
required in certain cases because "'[s]ome devices are so simple and their purpose
and efficacy so obvious that their complete construction is sufficient to demonstrate
their workability'" (quoting E. Rotorcraft Corp. v. United States, 384 F.2d 429, 431
(Ct. Cl. 1967)).
113 See Karen S. Canady, The Wright Enabling Disclosure for Biotechnology Patents, 69
WASH. L. REV. 455, 458 (1994); see also Cedarapids, Inc. v. Nordberg, Inc., No. 95-
1529, 1997 WL 452801 at *2 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 11, 1997) (explaining that in the chemi-
cal arts, "a slight variation . . . can yield an unpredictable result or may not work at
all."); In re Prutton, 200 F.2d 706, 712 (C.C.P.A. 1952) (holding that claims to a class
of chemical compounds, which were sufficiently broad to involve some speculation,
lack enablement, notwithstanding the presence of the operative specific examples
within the class); DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS & HOW THE
COURTS CAN SOLVE IT 115 (explaining that if the art is uncertain, "the court will be
inclined to require greater disclosure to satisfy the requirements of § 112, and corre-
spondingly narrow the scope of claims permissible for any given disclosure"). But see
Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Calgene, Inc., 188 F.3d 1362, 1374 n.10 (Fed. Cir. 1999) ("In
view of the rapid advances in science, we recognize that what may be unpredictable at
one point in time may become predictable at a later time."). Since enablement is
closely tied to the PHOSITA's identity, this helps to explain why it is a shifting, unsta-
ble doctrine. See Holbrook, supra note 28, at 176.
644 [VOL. 85-2
HeinOnline  -- 85 Notre Dame L. Rev. 644 2009-2010
THE TEACHING FUNCTION OF PATENTS
Given that a PHOSITA usually cannot predict experimental outcomes
with any reasonable likelihood of success, there is a danger that
embodiments not actually reduced to practice either cannot be made,
will not work for their intended purpose, or will require a PHOSITA
to engage in unduly extensive experimentation to figure out how to
practice the invention.1 14 Even the courts have recognized that work-
ing examples are most helpful for inventions at this end of the spec-
trum because it is in these fields where the PHOSITA often "has little
or no knowledge independent from the patentee's instruction."" 5
And with respect to teaching, innovators in unpredictable fields (and
particularly newer technologies) rely extensively on the technical liter-
ature; thus, they would certainly turn to another source if the relevant
patent lacked working examples. That possibility, all too common
under the current regime, is foreclosed by the proposal.
As a final illustration, consider the following hypothetical prose-
cution implementing the new examination protocol. The inventor
files a patent application directed toward a new class of pharmaceuti-
cal compounds. The application includes a generic claim that, by
claiming a core chemical structure with an array of twenty variables
appended to it, encompasses billions of chemical compounds.1 6 As is
typical in chemical cases, the claim is incredibly broad"' 7-here
114 See Seymore, supra note 29, at 138. See generally Herbert H. Goodman, The
Invalidation of Generic Claims by Inclusion of a Small Number of Inoperative Species, 40 J.
PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 745 (1958) (outlining several problems which arise in drafting chemi-
cal claims involving inductive reasoning from limited examples).
115 Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 363 F.3d 1247, 1254 (Fed. Cir. 2004); see also
In re Strahilevitz, 668 F.2d 1229, 1232 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (explaining that working exam-
ples are desirable in complex technologies).
116 See In re Driscoll, 562 F.2d 1245, 1249 (C.C.P.A. 1977) (explaining that the
practice of describing a class of chemical compounds in terms of structural formulas,
where the substituents are recited in the claim language, has been sanctioned by the
courts). This style of claiming is called Markush practice. See In re Harnisch, 631 F.2d
716, 719-20 (C.C.P.A. 1980) (explaining the history and current law of Markush prac-
tice). For an example of this style of claiming, see U.S. Patent No. 4,801,613 (filed
June 17, 1987) [hereinafter '613 patent]. Claim 1 of the '613 patent refers to "[a]
modified bradykinin type peptide having the formula A-Arg-B-C-D-W-X-Y-Z-Arg,"
where the variables A, B, C, D, W, X, Y, Z are each generic substructures reciting
smaller peptides or amino acids. Thus, the primary generic structure contains eight
smaller generic substructures. See id. cols. 19-20, 11. 21-41. All together, this claim
covers 10,235,904 formulations of a peptide. For an extreme example, see generally
U.S. Patent No. 5,422,351 (filed June 21, 1991) (including a structural formula in
claim 1 which encompasses at least one novemdecillion (which is ten followed by sixty
zeroes) chemical compounds).
117 See BRADLEY C. WRIGHT, DRAFTING PATENTS FOR LITIGATION AND LICENSING 457
(2008) (advising drafters of chemical patent applications to provide adequate support
for claims that often covers billions of species).
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because one can substitute each of the twenty variables appended to
the core structure with countless organic functional groups.118 The
written description, however, only sets forth five compounds actually
reduced to practice. These working examples are closely related to
each other in that the same variable (one of the twenty) was substi-
tuted in each. After construing the claims, assessing the level of skill
in the art, and evaluating the teaching provided, the examiner deter-
mines that the disclosure only teaches a PHOSITA how to make five
hundred compounds, not billions. Consequently, the examiner provi-
sionally rejects the broad generic claim for nonenablement and asks
the applicant to provide additional working examples to enable its full
scope. In response, the applicant amends the written description to
include an additional working example that substitutes one more vari-
ables on the core structure. In addition, the applicant voluntarily
cancels the broad generic claim and prosecutes a narrower subgenus
claim covering six hundred compounds. As a result, the applicant
obtains a patent where the claim scope obtained is truly commensu-
rate with the teaching provided in the written description.119
B. Drawing Support from History
An actual reduction to practice is no stranger to patent law.120 It
is a term of art which has been bandied about to resolve contests
between two or more parties claiming the same invention,'2 1 to prove
118 A functional group is a group of atoms within a molecule that represents a
potential reaction site in an organic compound. Functional groups determine a mol-
ecule's chemical reactivity. See generally RiCHARD C. LAROCK, COMPREHENSIVE ORGANIC
TRANSFORMATIONS (1999) (providing a systematic collection of synthetic transforma-
tions and reactions).
119 As stated above, in enforcing the patent, the patentee could rely on the doc-
trine of equivalents to obtain coverage for variations that embody the inventive con-
cept, beyond those specifically described in the written description. See supra note
101 and accompanying text.
120 For a detailed history of the role of an actual reduction to practice in patent
law, see generally 3A DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 10.06 (2005); William
C. Rooklidge & W. Gerard von Hoffmann, III, Reduction to Practice, Experimental Use,
and the "On Sale" and "Public Use" Bars to Patentability, 63 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1 (1988).
121 Patent rights are only awarded to the first inventor. 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) (2006)
(barring issuance of a patent when another inventor has made the invention before
the applicant). When two parties claim the same invention, a Patent Office intraof-
fice tribunal, known as the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences, institutes an
"interference" proceeding to determine which party is entitled to a patent. 35 U.S.C.
§ 135 (2006). The party who was first to reduce the invention to practice usually wins;
however, a party who was first to conceive the invention but last to reduce to practice
will win if that party demonstrates reasonable diligence toward the reduction to prac-
tice. See Cooper v. Goldfarb, 154 F.3d 1321, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 1998). Although filing a
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a date of invention to overcome prior art,122 to determine if an inven-
tion is "ready for patenting" in determining the critical date for the
on-sale and public use bars to patentability, 123 to show possession of
the invention,124 to prove operability,125 and to gauge enablement. 126
With respect to the latter three, an actual reduction to practice is typi-
cally not required to comply with the statutory requirements.127
Nonetheless, as discussed below, history reveals that the courts seem-
U.S. patent application establishes a constructive reduction to practice, a party can
obtain an earlier date by proving that the invention was actually reduced to practice
before the filing date. See Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d
1367, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
122 See, e.g., Mahurkar v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 79 F.3d 1572, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (hold-
ing that a catalog was not patent-defeating prior art because the invention was con-
ceived and actually reduced to practice prior to the publication date of the catalog).
123 See Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 66-68 (1998) (articulating the "ready
for patenting" prong for determining when the 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) bar to patentability
is triggered). If the invention was actually reduced to practice before being sold,
offered for sale, or was in public use more than one year before filing of the applica-
tion, a patent will be barred. See Invitrogen Corp. v. Biocrest Mfg., L.P., 424 F.3d
1374, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Vanmoor v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 201 F.3d 1363,
1366-67 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
124 See supra note 53 (discussing possession).
125 The claimed invention must be "capable of being used to effect the object
proposed." Mitchell v. Tilghman, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 287, 396 (1874). An invention
which is inoperative fails to satisfy the utility requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
See In re Harwood, 390 F.2d 985, 989 (C.C.P.A. 1968).
126 See infra notes 128-39 and accompanying text.
127 See Falko-Gunter Falkner v. Inglis, 448 F.3d 1357, 1366-67 (Fed. Cir. 2006)
(reiterating that an actual reduction to practice is not required). In the case of oper-
ability, the Federal Circuit has explained that the Patent Office "has the initial burden
of challenging a presumptively correct assertion of utility in the disclosure." In re
Brana, 51 F.3d 1560, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1995). Likewise, a patent application is presump-
tively enabled at the time of filing. See In re Marzocchi, 439 F.2d 220, 223 (C.C.P.A.
1971). The Pfaff Court pointed to the patent for Alexander Graham Bell's telephone,
which was upheld even though he filed the application before the invention was actu-
ally reduced to practice because "'[i]t is enough if he describes his method with suffi-
cient clearness and precision to enable those skilled in the matter to understand what
the process is, and if he points out some practicable way of putting it into operation.'"
Pfaff 525 U.S. at 62 (quoting The Telephone Cases, 126 U.S. 1, 536 (1888)). Argua-
bly, other language in the 1888 opinion suggests that this enablement standard is best
suited for inventions in the predictable arts. See id. ("'A good mechanic of proper skill
in matters of the kind can take the patent and, by following the specification strictly,
can, without more, construct an apparatus which, when used in the way pointed out,
will do all that it is claimed the method or process will do . . . .'" (quoting The Tele-
phone Cases, 126 U.S. at 536) (emphasis added)).
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ingly prefer, and in some cases require, working examples for inven-
tions in complex technologies.128
First, a few cases suggest that, in the early stages of development,
inventions in unpredictable technologies require actual experimenta-
tion to satisfy enablement.12 9 The case that best illustrates this pro-
position is Genentech, Inc. v. Novo Nordisk, A/S,1so which addressed the
sufficiency of disclosure in the rapidly advancing field of biotechnol-
ogy.'3 The invention related to a method for producing a protein,
human growth hormone (HGH), by using bacteria to first generate a
larger protein and then cleaving off the undesired portion with a tech-
nique called cleavable fusion expression.13 2 Rather than disclosing
specific materials, reaction conditions, or working examples, the rele-
vant portion of the written description merely described several sites
on the larger protein for which cleavable fusion expression "is gener-
ally well-suited."13 3 Genentech asserted that an enzymology textbook
and knowledge in the art could fill in gaps omitted from the
disclosure.1 3 4
128 For a general discussion of the history and rationale for the unwritten rule of
including examples in patent applications, see generally Bratislav Stankovic, The Use of
Examples in Patent Applications, 18 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 9 (2006).
129 See, e.g., Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 363 F.3d 1247 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (pat-
ent for monoclonal antibodies capable of fighting breast cancer); Genentech, Inc. v.
Novo Nordisk, A/S, 108 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (patent for a cleavable fusion
process for creating human growth hormone). Aside from any heightened disclosure
standard that attaches with unpredictability, there may also be an underlying public
policy rationale. See, e.g., Canady, supra note 113, at 462 (describing the tension in
balancing the need to grant broad claims to meaningfully reward valuable advances
against the concern that granting broad claims will hinder further advances or dispro-
portionately reward those who make small, but timely, contributions).
130 108 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
131 This field encompasses technologies related to modifying biological materials
to benefit humankind. Inventions range from tailor-made drugs to biofuels, and
cures for acquired and genetic diseases. Perhaps not surprisingly, the courts classify
the field as "highly unpredictable." See Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Calgene, Inc., 188 F.3d
1362, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 1999). For an interesting commentary on the Federal Circuit's
jurisprudence in biotechnology cases, see Lawrence M. Sung, Stranger in a Strange
Land: Biotechnology and the Federal Circuit, 2 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 167 (2000).
132 Genentech, 108 F.3d at 1363.
133 Id. at 1365.
134 See id. Genentech relied, to its detriment, on the oft-cited statement that "a
patent need not teach, and preferably omits, what is well known in the art."
Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 1986);
see also Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 481 F.3d 1371, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
(explaining that the written description need not necessarily describe how to make
and use every embodiment of the invention because the PHOSITA's "'knowledge of
the prior art and routine experimentation can often fill in the gaps'" (quoting AK
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When faced with the question of whether the written description
would have enabled a PHOSITA at the time of filing to use cleavable
fusion expression to make HGH without undue experimentation,1 3 5
the Federal Circuit determined that it did not:
"[A] patent is not a hunting license. It is not a reward for the
search, but compensation for its successful conclusion."[ ] Tossing
out the mere germ of an idea does not constitute enabling disclo-
sure. While every aspect of a [broad] claim certainly need not have
been carried out by an inventor, or exemplified[ .] .. reasonable
detail must be provided in order to enable members of the public to
understand and carry out the invention....
. . . It is the [written description], not the knowledge of one
skilled in the art, that must supply the novel aspects of an invention
in order to constitute adequate enablement.13 6
The absence of any actual details, coupled with the fact that no
one had been able to produce any human protein via cleavable fusion
expression at the time of filing, led the court to easily conclude that a
PHOSITA would require undue experimentation to obtain the
claimed result.13 7 Indeed, the speculative statement in the written
description "provide [d] only a starting point, a direction for further
research."1 3 8 In sum, an enabling description for inventions of this
type must provide the PHOSITA with "a specific and useful
teaching."1 3 9
Second, when an applicant purports to invent something that is
contrary to well-settled scientific principles, the lack of working exam-
Steel Corp. v. Sollac, 344 F.3d 1234, 1244 (Fed. Cir. 2003)); In re Eynde, 480 F.2d
1364, 1370 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (explaining that an applicant can use references to estab-
lish the knowledge in the art).
135 For a list of relevant considerations, see infra note 160 and accompanying text.
136 Genentech, 108 F.3d at 1366 (emphasis added) (quoting Brenner v. Manson,
383 U.S. 519, 536 (1966)); see also Auto. Techs. Int'l, Inc. v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 501
F.3d 1274, 1283-84 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (extending this reasoning to predictable
technologies).
137 Genentech, 108 F.3d at 1366-67; see also Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Calgene, Inc.,
188 F.3d 1362, 1371-72 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (explaining that in both prosecution and
litigation, the enablement determination "is made retrospectively, i.e., by looking back
to the filing date of the patent application and determining whether undue experi-
mentation would have been required to make and use the claimed invention at that
time"); In re Glass, 492 F.2d 1228, 1232 (C.C.P.A. 1974) (explaining that sufficiency is
judged on an application's filing date).
138 Genentech, 108 F.3d at 1366.
139 Id. at 1368; see also Chiron Corp., v. Genentech, Inc. 363 F.3d 1247, 1254-56
(Fed. Cir. 2004) (affirming the district court's conclusion of nonenablement because
the written description for the claimed monoclonal antibodies lacked a "specific and
useful teaching" (quoting Genentech, 108 F.3d at 1368)).
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ples has led courts to conclude that the putative invention is inopera-
tive140 and, therefore, unteachable.141 For example, in In re
Eltgroth,142 the invention related to a method for controlling the aging
process by manipulating the concentration of isotopes1 4 3 of specific
elements within an organism.14 4 Although several references taught
how to chemically manipulate the isotope concentrations, the U.S.
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals'4 5 (C.C.P.A.) agreed with the
Board of Patent Appeals' decisionl 46 that the invention was unpatent-
able because the applicant provided no tangible method for achieving
the claimed result:
Not one example is given. Not one isotope [affecting] aging is
identified . . . . Moreover, appellant has . . . failed to show how
knowledge available to [PHOSITAs] would enable them to make
and use his invention despite the lack of specific disclosure....
[A]ppellant has provided no more than a speculative theory or
hypothesis, highly significant though it may be ... .14
The court rejected the application because it merely invited others to
engage in undue experimentation to achieve the claimed result. 4 8
Although patent applicants typically enjoy a presumption of oper-
ability,' 49 In re Eltgroth and similar "incredible utility" cases create a
strong presumption of inoperativeness because the alleged inventions
140 See supra note 125.
141 If a claimed invention fails to satisfy the utility requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 101
(2006), the written description, as a matter of law, lacks enablement under § 112
because a PHOSITA cannot practice the invention. See Process Control Corp. v.
HydReclaim Corp., 190 F.3d 1350, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 1999); In re Ziegler, 992 F.2d 1197,
1200-01 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
142 419 F.2d 918 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
143 Isotopes are atoms of a particular element with an atypical number of neutrons
in their nuclei.
144 In re Eltgroth, 419 F.2d at 918-19.
145 The C.C.P.A. was the predecessor to the Federal Circuit. See supra note 41.
146 The Board of Patent Appeals was the predecessor to the Board of Patent
Appeals and Interferences ("Board"). See supra note 121. In its appellate role, the
Board reviews adverse decisions of examiners. See 35 U.S.C. § 6(b) (2006). An appli-
cant whose claims have been twice rejected by the examiner may appeal to the Board.
Id. § 134(a) (2006). The Board can affirm a rejection or reverse and remand to the
examining corps. 37 C.F.R. § 1.197 (2009) (promulgating Patent Office regulations
pertaining to the Board). An applicant dissatisfied with a Board decision can appeal
to the Federal Circuit. 35 U.S.C. § 141 (2006).
147 In re Eltgroth, 419 F.2d at 921.
148 Id.
149 See In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (articulating the presump-
tion of utility and the burden-shifting framework).
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clearly conflict with recognized scientific principles.1 50 But on those
occasions where applicants overcame this strong presumption of
inoperability, it was the working example that provided the best evi-
dence that the state of the art had advanced far enough to allow a
PHOSITA to achieve the claimed result.'5 1
Finally, the C.C.P.A. wisely recognized that the research costs
associated with providing working examples might be cheaper than
the costs associated with fighting over enablement with the Patent
Office or with alleged infringers in patent litigation. In In re
Strahilevitz,15 2 the invention related to methods and devices for remov-
ing antigens from mammalian blood through dialysis.153 The exam-
iner rejected the claims for nonenablement because the applicant
disclosed no working examples, experimental data, or descriptions of
treatments on humans or animals.154 Rather, the written description
was "'replete with statements as to what may be done." 55 The Board,
in affirming the examiner's rejection, recognized that, "' [w]hile ...
specific examples are not necessary to meet the requirements of Sec-
tion 112, when present, they do provide good evidence that the disclo-
sure is enabling and that the invention may be performed without
undue experimentation."'15 6 The C.C.P.A. did not adopt the high
standard and reversed in part because the applicant was able to point
to known prior art techniques to fill in the gaps omitted from the
150 See In re Chilowsky, 229 F.2d 457, 462 (C.C.P.A. 1956) (articulating the strong
presumption of operability). For more examples of "incredible utility" cases, see gen-
erally In re Swartz, 232 F.3d 862 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (generating energy with "cold
fusion"), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 916 (2003); Newman v. Quigg, 877 F.2d 1575 (Fed. Cir.
1989) (perpetual motion machine), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 932 (1990); Fregeau v. Mos-
singhoff, 776 F.2d 1034 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (using a magnetic field to alter the taste of
food); In re Ruskin, 354 F.2d 395 (C.C.P.A. 1966) (increasing the energy output of
fossil fuels through exposure to a magnetic field).
151 For example, working examples helped the C.C.P.A. conclude that the scien-
tific community would recognize that cancer is curable. Compare In re Citron, 325
F.2d 248, 249-53 (C.C.P.A. 1963) (explaining that applicants' invention relating to an
alleged effective treatment for cancer, which lacked specific tests, experiments, or
clinical data, asserted incredible utility in the light of the knowledge of the art), with
In reJolles, 628 F.2d 1322, 1326-28 (C.C.P.A. 1980) (concluding that clinical tests,
combined with the close structural similarity of the claimed compounds with chemo-
therapeutics known in the art, would allow a PHOSITA to accept the claimed utility).
152 668 F.2d 1229 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
153 Id. at 1230.
154 Id. at 1231.
155 Id. (quoting examiner's findings).
156 Id. (quoting Patent and Trademark Office Board of Appeals).
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disclosure., 5 7 Nonetheless, the court "recognize [d] that working exam-
ples are desirable in complex technologies" and, by providing good evidence
of enablement, "might well have avoided a lengthy and, no doubt,
expensive appeal." 58
C. Potential Benefits
1. It Will Simplify the Enablement Inquiry
Given that the teaching function and enablement are inextricably
related, it is worth exploring how the enablement inquiry will change
under the new regime. Before doing so, it is necessary to briefly
explain why the enablement analysis is difficult under the current
framework. To begin, the ultimate determination of whether a
PHOSITA can make and use the claimed invention without undue
experimentation is a legal one, based on underlying factual inquir-
ies.' 59 Relevant considerations include the nature of the invention,
the breadth of the claims, the level of predictability of the art, the
quantity of experimentation necessary, the presence or absence of
working examples, the amount of direction presented, the prior art,
and the relative skill of those in the art.160
Perhaps not surprisingly, there is no consensus about where the
enablement analysis should begin or, stated differently, which factor is
most important. As discussed above, one enduring approach calls for
first classifying the invention as predictable or unpredictable and then
proceeding from there.1 61 But Judge Giles S. Rich criticized the pre-
dictable-unpredictable dichotomy long ago because it ignores the pos-
157 Id. at 1232; see also In re Eynde, 480 F.2d 1364, 1370 (C.C.P.A. 1973) ("A patent
applicant may offer evidence, such as patents and printed publications, to show the
knowledge possessed by those skilled in the art, and thereby establish that a given
disclosure is enabling.").
158 In re Strahilevitz, 668 F.2d at 1232 (emphasis added).
159 See In re Swartz, 232 F.3d 862, 863 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
160 See In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988). The list, commonly
referred to as the Wands factors, found its roots in the Patent Office. Cf Ex parte
Forman, 230 U.S.P.Q. 546, 547 (B.P.A.I. 1986) ("The factors to be considered [in a
determination of what constitutes undue experimentation] have been summarized as
the quantity of experimentation necessary, the amount of direction or guidance
presented, the presence or absence of working examples, the nature of the invention,
the state of the prior art, the relative skill of those in that art, the predictability or
unpredictability of the art and the breadth of the claims." (citing In re Rainer, 347
F.2d 574 (C.C.P.A. 1965)). The Federal Circuit has noted that the Wands factors are
"illustrative [and] not mandatory." Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200,
1213 (Fed. Cir. 1991). What is relevant depends on the facts of each case. See id.
161 For deeper discussion of the predictable-unpredictable dichotomy, see gener-
ally Seymore, supra note 29; Seymore, supra note 40.
652 [VOL. 85:2
HeinOnline  -- 85 Notre Dame L. Rev. 652 2009-2010
THE TEACHING FUNCTION OF PATENTS
sibility, for example, that a mechanical invention can have
unpredictable features. 162 More recently, various legal actors disagree
about whether the enablement analysis should begin inwardly with
the applicant's disclosure' 63 or outwardly by gauging the PHOSITA's
knowledge. 164 But regardless of where the analysis begins, the ulti-
mate question is whether the enablement provided is commensurate
with the claim scope sought.165
Under the new regime, the enablement analysis would begin with
the working examples provided in the written description. 166 In addi-
tion to providing a ready mechanism for answering the commensura-
bility question, 16 7 they provide the best evidence of enablement
because, unlike prophetic examples, nothing is left to speculation or
doubt.168 Indeed, this approach will prevent the patentee from
obtaining claim scope that extends beyond the patentee's contribu-
tion to the art.
2. It Will Yield More Robust Patents
An actual reduction to practice will afford patentees more robust
protection by allowing them to disclose and claim better embodi-
162 See In re Bowen, 492 F.2d 859, 861-62 (C.C.P.A. 1974).
163 See, e.g., Sitrick v. DreamWorks, LLC, 516 F.3d 993, 1000 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (not-
ing that an enablement analysis begins with the disclosure).
164 Dennis Crouch contends that "enablement should begin with the knowledge
of one skilled in the art and move forward from there." Patently-O, http://
www.patentlyo.com/patent/2008/02/enablement-cont.html (Feb. 4, 2008, 03:43
CST).
165 See MPEP, supra note 44, § 2164.04 (instructing an examiner who suspects that
one or more claims lack enablement to first construe the claims to determine their
scope); AK Steel Corp. v. Sollac, 344 F.3d 1234, 1241 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (explaining that
because a patent's written description must enable the full scope of the claimed
invention, the enablement inquiry typically begins with a construction of the claims).
166 The presence (or absence) of working examples is particularly important for
complex inventions. See supra Part II.A.2.
167 See Nat'l Recovery Techs., Inc. v. Magnetic Separation Sys., Inc., 166 F.3d 1190,
1196 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (holding that "the scope of the claims must be less than or
equal to the scope of enablement"); Moy, supra note 81, at 1081 (discussing the bene-
fits of central claiming). As I have written elsewhere, a patent application which lacks
working examples can raise a presumption of undue experimentation, particularly in
the unpredictable arts. See Seymore, supra note 29, at 154-58.
168 Cf In re Lorenz, 305 F.2d 875, 878 (C.C.P.A. 1962) (stating that the strong and
comprehensive language of § 112 evinces Congress's intent for applicants to "make a
full and complete disclosure of their invention, leaving nothing to speculation or
doubt"); In re Folkers, 344 F.2d 970, 975 (C.C.P.A. 1965) ("The specification must
leave nothing to 'speculation or doubt,' or require one skilled in the art to experi-
ment at great lengths before he can [practice] the invention." (quoting In re Lorenz,
305 F.2d at 878).
2010] 653
HeinOnline  -- 85 Notre Dame L. Rev. 653 2009-2010
654 NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW [VOL. 85:2
ments. 169 To begin, inventors usually spend some amount of time
refining the invention.1 7 0 These refinements produce a better inven-
tion-whether it be safer, cheaper, more efficient, more durable, or
more effective.171 Thus, if the invention is actually reduced to prac-
tice before filing, the patentee can describe and claim the refined
embodiments in the patent application. Consequently, the patentee
can better protect the embodiment being marketed since it is that
embodiment which competitors will likely target.17 2 The resulting
patent, by disclosing the post-conception refinements to the inven-
tion, will "provide[ ] the public a readily available teaching of the
most practicable device."173
3. It Will Bridge the Disconnect Between Science and Patent Law
Insisting on working examples (at least for complex inventions)
will resolve a striking incongruity between the norms of scientific com-
munication and the patent laws. A key distinction between the two is
that the former focuses on work that has been done rather than on
speculative results. 174 Indeed, in scientific publishing, the author-sci-
entist must demonstrate an understanding of the underlying science
169 See note 23 (defining "embodiment").
170 Although the patent laws encourage prompt filing, "the public interest is also
deemed to be served by allowing an inventor time to perfect his invention." TP Labs.,
Inc. v. Profl Positioners, Inc., 724 F.2d 965, 968 (Fed. Cir. 1984). So, while public use
of the invention more than one year prior to filing can bar issuance of a patent under
35 U.S.C. § 102(b), a judicially created doctrine known as the experimental use
exception can negate the bar by affording the inventor time to improve and perfect
the invention. See City of Elizabeth v. Am. Nicholson Pavement Co., 97 U.S. 126,
134-38 (1877) (articulating the doctrine); Allen Eng'g Corp. v. Bartell Indus., Inc.,
299 F.3d 1336, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (listing objective criteria for determining if a use
is experimental).
171 Likewise, further tweaking may lead the inventor to conclude that it is not
worth the time and expense of prosecuting a patent application. See In re Hamilton,
882 F.2d 1576, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
172 For example, a competitor can attempt to design around the invention or find
flaws in the disclosure to invalidate it. See infra note 231 and accompanying text.
173 Brief of Amicus Curiae American Intellectual Property Law Association in Sup-
port of Petitioner at 9, Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55 (1998) (No. 97-1130).
174 Even research grant proposals, which are inherently speculative because they
propose research, often include some actual experimental results because it is virtually
impossible to obtain a favorable review without strong preliminary data. See, e.g., Wil-
liam Gerin, Writing the NIH Grant Proposal 82 (2006) (suggesting that the presence
of preliminary data that "bear[s] directly on the research question at hand" is crucial
to obtaining NIH funding); LIANE REIF-LEHRER, GRANT APPLICATION WRITER'S HAND-
BOOK 28 (4th ed. 2005) (stating that having "substantive preliminary results" improve
the chances of getting funded).
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and support alleged discoveries with actual results, that are often con-
firmed through replicate experiments.1 7 5  Ultimately, the scientific
community polices both the understanding and the alleged discover-
ies through peer review.176
By contrast, patent law does not require that an inventor under-
stand the underlying science.17 7 In addition, an applicant usually has
no obligation to support the putative invention with actual proof.1 78
These departures from the norms of science may exist because patent
law is more concerned with the "thing" and less with the path to the
"thing" or the acumen of the person who made it."'7  Nonetheless, the
175 See, e.g., ADIL E. SHAMoo & DAVID B. RESNIK, RESPONSIBLE CONDUCT OF
RESEARCH 51 (2d ed. 2009) ("The ability of other investigators to replicate the experi-
ments by following the method in the published report is crucial to the advancement
of science.").
176 Peer review "is quite efficient at screening out papers that are too speculative
or where there are serious errors in the design of the study or in the analysis of data."
KENNETH R. FOSTER & PETER W. HUBER, JUDGING SCIENCE 171 (1997); see also COMM.
Sci., ENG'G, & PUB. POLIcy, NAT'L AcAD. OF SCIs., ON BEING A SCIENTIST 33 (3d ed.
2009) (explaining that vetting research results through peer review improves the
quality of scientific publications). For a deeper discussion of peer view in science, see
ELIZABETH WAGER ET AL., How TO SURVIVE PEER REVIEW 1 (2002) (describing the con-
cept of peer review as "an important milestone[ ] of funding and publication, the
concept of critical discussion of ideas and findings [which] runs through the entire
scientific process").
177 See Diamond Rubber Co. v. Consol. Rubber Tire Co., 220 U.S. 428, 435-36
(1911) ("It is certainly not necessary that [the inventor] understand or be able to state
the scientific principles underlying his invention . . . ."); Newman v. Quigg, 877 F.2d
1575, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1989) ("[I]t is not a requirement of patentability that an inven-
tor correctly set forth or even know, how or why the invention works . . . ."); In re
Libby, 255 F.2d 412, 415 (C.C.P.A. 1958) ("It is not necessary that a patentee should
understand the scientific principles underlying his invention, so long as he makes a
sufficient disclosure to enable other persons skilled in the art to practice the
invention.").
178 See Hyatt v. Boone, 146 F.3d 1348, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (" [T]he inventor need
not provide evidence of either conception or actual reduction to practice when rely-
ing on the content of the patent application."); discussion supra Part I.A. A narrow
exception arises in "incredible utility" cases. See supra note 150 and accompanying
text.
179 See Eames v. Andrews, 122 U.S. 40, 56 (1887) (explaining that an inventor's
ignorance of the scientific principles is immaterial as long as the patent's disclosure
sets forth the "thing" to be done so that it can be reproduced); Life Techs., Inc. v.
Clontech Labs., Inc., 224 F.3d 1320, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2000) ("'Patentability shall not be
negatived by the manner in which the invention was made.'" (quoting 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a))); Radiator Specialty Co. v. Buhot, 39 F.2d 373, 376 (3d Cir. 1930) ("It is
with the inventive concept, the thing achieved, not with the manner of its achieve-
ment or the quality of the mind which gave it birth, that the patent law concerns
itself."); cf Earle v. Sawyer, 8 F. Cas. 254, 256 (C.C.D. Mass. 1825) (No. 4,247) (Story,
J.) ("It is of no consequence, whether the thing be simple or complicated; whether it
2010] 655
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heightened standard of disclosure will bridge the gap between patent
law and the norms of science which, hopefully, will induce innovators
to turn to patents for substantive technical information.
4. It Will Make Patents a Competitive Source of Technical
Knowledge
Under the current regime, an innovator who seeks to understand
an invention constructively reduced to practice must hope that the
inventor chose to disclose the details in another medium.1 8 0 When
this does not happen, the innovator probably has a slim chance of
extracting any substantive technical information from the patent's
written description. 81 Under the new standard, the written descrip-
tion will eventually resemble the experimental section of a technical
journal.
182
Although patents may never achieve the elite status of academic
literature, in some cases patents are a good alternative source of infor-
mation because "the patent record isjust as much a repository of accu-
mulated public domain knowledge on which researchers may rely and
build as the scientific literature is."183 First, while scientific journals
typically charge high subscription rates, patents are freely accessible to
be by accident, or by long, laborious thought .. . that it is first done [because] [t]he
law looks to the fact, and not to the process by which it is accomplished ...
180 See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
181 See discussion supra Part I.
182 Articles in peer-reviewed scientific publications tend to include an abstract,
introduction, experimental section, results, discussion, and conclusion. As the name
implies, the experimental section discloses working examples and other experimental
details. See sources cited supra note 96.
183 Charles R. McManis & Sucheol Noh, The Impact of the Bayh-Dole Act on
Genetic Research and Development: Evaluating the Arguments and Empirical Evi-
dence to Date 35 (Aug. 13, 2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Berkley
Center for Law & Technology) (manuscript at 35), available at http://
www.law.berkeley.edu/institutes/bclt/ipsc/papers2/mcmanis.doc. McManis and
Noh also evaluate an empirical study which suggests that, due to an anticommons
effect, in cases where scientific research is published and subsequently patented, cita-
tions to the journal article may drop off once the corresponding patent issues. Id.; see
Fiona Murray & Scott Stern, Do Formal Intellectual Property Rights Hinder the Free Flow of
Scientific Knowledge? An Empirical Test of the Anti-Commons Hypothesis, 63J. EcoN. BEHAV.
& ORG. 648, 664-68 (2007). In rejecting this hypothesis, McManis and Noh argue in
the alternative that when the patent publishes, communication among researchers
"might to some extent shift from the scientific literature to the patent record, with the
issued patent becoming a focus of citations both in the scientific literature and in
subsequent patent applications of academic researchers seeking to distinguish their
follow-on innovation from the prior art." McManis & Noh, supra (manuscript at 33).
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the public.18 4 Second, patents can, at times, communicate knowledge
more quickly,185 or even in greater detail,186 than other information
sources. Third, when the patent system is the sole medium of disclo-
sure, the document provides technical knowledge that would other-
wise be inaccessible to the public.18 7
III. CRITICISMS AND LIMITS OF THE TEACHING FUNCTION
A. Conflicting Policy Concerns
Although working examples may provide the best teaching, com-
peting policy concerns may explain why the courts have resisted mak-
ing an actual reduction to practice the benchmark for disclosure.' 88
184 See U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Patent Full-Text and Full-Page Image
Databases, http://patft.uspto.gov (last visited Nov. 22, 2009) (providing free access
for patents issued since 1790 and patent applications published since March, 2001).
185 GORDON & COOKFAIR, supra note 11, at 52. One excellent historical example is
the case of the two inventions which shared the 1963 Nobel Prize in Chemistry:
The discoveries of Ziegler and Natta in the field of olefin polymerization did
not appear in the general chemical literature until about 1960, while their
patents were filed in 1953 and published in several countries in 1955. Peo-
ple following the patent literature found the work, were able to base their
research on the examples given in the patents, and started to expand on
these famous inventions long before their appearance in the chemical
journals.
Id. Nowadays many technical journals have electronic submission and expedited
peer-review processes designed to facilitate quick dissemination. Similarly, relatively
recent amendments to the patent statutes also facilitate quicker dissemination. Spe-
cifically, since 1999, most patent applications publish eighteen months after the earli-
est effective filing date. 35 U.S.C. § 122(b) (1) (A) (2006).
186 The norms of science dictate that scientists engage in full and open communi-
cation when they disclose research. See ROBERT K. MERTON, THE SOCIOLOGY OF SCI-
ENCE 274 (Norman W. Storer ed. 1973). While researchers should respect this norm
when drafting the experimental section of their journal articles, the details provided
may be insufficient to replicate the experiment because the researcher can obtain a
competitive advantage by choosing to keep certain techniques secret. Diana Hicks,
Published Papers, Tacit Competencies and Corporate Management of the Public/Private Charac-
ter of Knowledge, 4 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 401, 408 (1995). Indeed, academics and
others who publish in journals "manage the release of their knowledge by choosing
how much they disclose." Id. In contrast, the patent laws require, at least in theory,
that the inventor fully disclose the invention. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006). For a recent
investigation of the relationship between patenting and faculty publishing behavior,
see generally Kira R. Fabrizio & Alberto Di Minin, Commercializing the Laboratory:
Faculty Patenting and the Open Science Environment, 37 RES. POL'v 914 (2008).
187 See infra note 233 and accompanying text.
188 Nonetheless, the courts' recent eagerness to invalidate patents for nonenable-
ment suggests that the winds of change are possibly afoot. See Seymore, supra note 40,
at 284-89.
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First, given the complex nature of patent law and its apparently com-
peting goals of fostering innovation and disseminating information,
some might argue that a new disclosure regime tips the balance too
far in one direction.189 The primary concern is that it would delay
entry into the patent system because the inventor would need to
engage in additional pre-filing experimentation to produce working
examples. This delay would arguably thwart innovation. 90 In addi-
tion, "the patent law[s] place[] strong pressure on filing the patent
application early in the development of the technology, often before
the commercial embodiment is developed or all of the boundaries
[are] fully explored."191 The concern here is that patentees who fail
to file promptly will compromise their patent rights, both in the
United States' 92 and abroad.193
189 See, e.g., Hormone Research Found., Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 904 F.2d 1558,
1568 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (arguing that limiting the scope of the claims to the specific
embodiments disclosed is a poor way to stimulate invention and discourages early
disclosure). But see Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480-81 (1974)
(explaining that one purpose of the patent system is to promote disclosure of inven-
tions which stimulates further innovation and permits the public to practice the
invention once the patent expires).
190 Judge Newman argues that a patentee's obligation to disclose should not
destroy the incentive to innovate:
As implemented by the patent statute, the grant of the right to exclude car-
ries the obligation to disclose the workings of the invention, thereby adding
to the store of knowledge without diminishing the patent-supported incen-
tive to innovate.
But the obligation to disclose is not the principal reason for a patent
system .... The reason for the patent system is to encourage innovation and
its fruits ....
Paulik v. Rizkalla, 760 F.2d 1270, 1276 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (en banc).
191 Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1536 (Fed. Cir.
1995) (en banc) (Newman, J., concurring), rev'd on other grounds, 520 U.S. 17 (1997);
see also Edlyn S. Simmons, Prior Art Searching in the Preparation of Pharmaceutical Patent
Applications, 3 DRUG DiscovERY TODAY 52, 52 (1998) (explaining the importance of
drafting broad generic claims which include hypothetical compounds in order to pre-
vent competitors from developing them). In addition, some would even argue that
the ability to obtain patent protection at the early stages of the inventive process is
necessary in order to maintain the incentive for the investment of venture capital in
research and development. See Dana Rohrabacher & Paul Crilly, The Case for a Strong
Patent System, 8 HARV.J.L. & TECH. 263, 271 (1995). But while an actual reduction to
practice may lead to a delay in filing, it may also yield a more robust patent which
better protects the embodiment that is potentially marketed. See discussion supra Part
II.C.2.
192 For example, an applicant must file a patent application within one year of
disclosing the invention in a printed publication. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006). Like-
wise, if the invention is used in public, sold, or subject to an offer for sale in the
United States, the applicant must file within one year of the event. Id. A fundamental
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Second, several commentators and judges discourage tying claim
scope too closely to those embodiments actually reduced to prac-
tice. 19 4 For example, Professors Merges and Nelson contend that lim-
iting patent rights in this way would lead to a narrow patent that
would have little value because an imitator could find minor variations
over the disclosed embodiments. 195
In response, it is important to recognize that the current disclo-
sure framework itself can thwart innovation. Specifically, the broad ex
ante incentives of the current regime can discourage ex post improve-
ment activity. As an example of this problem, consider O'Reilly v.
Morse.19 6 Though he invented a telegraph that used his code, Samuel
Morse obtained a patent with a claim that covered "the exclusive right
to every improvement where the motive power is [electromagnet-
ism], . . . and the result is the marking or printing intelligible charac-
purpose of the § 102(b) "statutory bar" is to encourage prompt filing. Woodland
Trust v. Flowertree Nursery, Inc., 148 F.3d 1368, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1998); DURHAM,
supra note 4, at 121-23 (explaining the threefold policy rationale for § 102(b)). In
addition to the statutory bar, § 102(g) acts to "penalize[ ] the unexcused delay or
failure of a first inventor to share the 'benefit of the knowledge of [the] invention'
with the public after the invention has been completed." Checkpoint Sys., Inc. v. U.S.
Int'l Trade Comm'n, 54 F.3d 756, 761 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (quoting Paulik, 760 F.2d at
1280 (Rich, J., concurring)). Professor Mark Lemley explains that:
By waiting too long to file a patent application or inventing without giving
the world the benefit of the invention, inventors lose not only their own
rights to file for a patent but also the ability to prevent a second inventor
who does give the world the benefit of the invention from obtaining her own
patent.
Lemley & Tangri, supra note 17, at 1102 (citations omitted).
193 The one-year grace period available in the United States is not available in
many foreign countries. In fact, most countries have an "absolute novelty" require-
ment such that any pre-filing disclosure, including activity by the inventor, is patent-
defeating. See, e.g., Convention on the Grant of European Patents, art. 54(2), Oct. 5,
1973, 1065 U.N.T.S. 255, 272. Accordingly, if foreign filing is contemplated, the
applicant must take steps to avoid inadvertent or premature disclosure. See DAVID A.
BURGE, PATENT & TRADEMARK TACTIcs & PRACTICE 127-36 (3d ed. 1999) (detailing
foreign patent filing procedures).
194 See, e.g., Invitrogen Corp. v. Clontech Labs., Inc., 429 F.3d 1052, 1071 (Fed.
Cir. 2005) (arguing that narrow patent rights become worthless as new modes of prac-
ticing the inventor develop); Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex
Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 845 (1990); accord SRI Int'l v. Matsu-
shita Elec. Corp., 775 F.2d 1107, 1121 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (explaining that the law does
not require that an applicant describe every conceivable embodiment of the
invention).
195 Merges & Nelson, supra note 194, at 845.
196 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62 (1854). For a fuller discussion of Morse and interesting
tidbits surrounding the case, see KENNETH SILVERMAN, LIGHTNING MAN 319-24 (2003).
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ters, signs, or letters at a distance."' 9 7 In striking down the claim, the
Supreme Court stated:
It is impossible to misunderstand the extent of this claim.
If this claim can be maintained, it matters not by what process
or machinery the result is accomplished. . . . [S]ome future inven-
tor, in the onward march of science, may discover a mode of writing
or printing at a distance [with electromagnetism] without using any
part of the process or combination set forth in the plaintiffs
specification.
... In fine he claims an exclusive right to use a manner and
process which he has not described and indeed had not
invented .. 9. 8
So, while Morse's written description taught and enabled telegraphy
with his device, had the claim survived, it would have dominated other
technological innovations that only subsequent workers in the field
could teach and enable.' 9 9
To illustrate this last point, consider text messaging, which clearly
falls within the scope of Morse's claim. 2 0 0 If Morse's patent were in
force at the time of its advent, inventors would have had to consider at
least three things: (1) whether they would need to obtain a license
from Morse during the development and experimental stages of the
technology to avoid infringement;2 0 ' (2) that a text messaging patent
would be "subservient" to Morse's "dominant" patent;202 and (3) that
a potential licensee of the text messaging patent would have to obtain
197 O'Reilly, 56 U.S. (15 How.) at 112 (emphasis added).
198 Id. at 112-13.
199 Richard H. Stern, Solving The Algorithm Conundrum: After 1994 in the Federal Cir-
cuit Patent Law Needs a Radical Algorithmectomy, 22 AIPLA Q.J. 167, 211 (1994).
200 See Alan Durham, Natural Laws and Inevitable Infringement, 93 MINN. L. REV.
933, 957-58 (2009) (discussing overly broad claims involving natural phenomena).
201 See infra notes 231-32 and accompanying text.
202 See Stern, supra note 199, at 172 n.14. To begin, the patent laws allow an
improver to obtain a patent for an invention which is a novel and nonobvious variant
of a device covered by a broader claim. Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 787 (1876)
("One invention may include within it many others, and each and all may be valid at
the same time."). As Merges and Nelson explain:
Two patents are said to block each other when one patentee has a broad
patent on an invention and another has a narrower patent on some
improved feature of that invention. The broad patent is said to "dominate"
the narrower one. In such a situation, the holder of the narrower ("sub-
servient") patent cannot practice her invention without a license from the
holder of the dominant patent. At the same time, the holder of the domi-
nant patent cannot practice the particular improved feature claimed in the
narrower patent without a license.
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a license from Morse to practice the invention. 203 In sum, Morse's
patent "would take away, or at least diminish, their potential rewards
as incentive to invent and would thus discourage their creative
efforts. "204
Of course, the corollary to this is that a narrow patent scope can
foster innovation by making it easier for subsequent inventors to
improve on existing patented technology.205 A more technically
robust patent document, replete with working examples, will allow fol-
low-on innovators to more easily and quickly create second-generation
products and processes. 206 But, just as importantly, the new regime
will promote the diffusion of knowledge across disciplines. Given the
increased interest in interdisciplinary knowledge transfer, it may fos-
ter the cross-pollination of ideas and serve as a driver for more crea-
tive innovation. 207
Merges & Nelson, supra note 194, at 860-61. Importantly, "the dominant patentee
can exclude the subservient patentee from practicing her invention at all, and the
subservient patentee can exclude the dominant patentee from practicing [the
improvement]." Id. at 861 n.96 (emphasis added); see also Cantrell v. Wallick, 117
U.S. 689, 694 (1886) (explaining that where one patent is an improvement on
another patent, "neither of the two patentees can lawfully use the invention of the
other without the other's consent").
203 See Stern, supra note 199, at 172 n.14.
204 Id. at 172; accord The Incandescent Lamp Patent, 159 U.S. 465, 476 (1895)
(explaining that overbreadth "operate[s] rather to discourage than to promote
innovation").
205 Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure of High Technology Industrial Disticts:
Silicon Valley, Route 128, and Covenants Not to Compete, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 628
(1999); see also Merges & Nelson, supra note 194, at 907 (a patent holder who licenses
widely and collects royalties is more conducive to development of multiple applica-
tions). And "[w]hile it is intuitive that broader patents are more valuable than nar-
rower ones, even a narrow patent that is properly placed can have significant value,
sometimes more so than a broader patent covering a wide swath of a less lucrative or
developed field." John R. Allison et al., Valuable Patents, 92 GEO. L.J. 435, 440 (2004).
206 Here it is important to repeat that an applicant need not provide a working
example for every embodiment encompassed by a claim. Cf In re Grimme, 274 F.2d
949, 952 (C.C.P.A. 1960) ("It is manifestly impracticable for an applicant who dis-
closes a generic invention to give an example of every species falling within it. . . .").
Rather, the precise number required will depend on the nature of the technology and
vary from case to case. In re Shokal, 242 F.2d 771, 773 (C.C.P.A. 1957) ("Thus, in the
case of a small genus .. . consisting of four species, a reduction to practice of three, or
perhaps even two, might serve to complete the generic invention, while in the case of
a genus comprising hundreds of species, a considerably larger number of reductions
to practice would probably be necessary.").
207 See generally ANDREW HARGADON, How BREAKTHROUGHs HAPPEN (2003) (exam-
ining the strategies and work practices of firms that have built an enduring capacity
for breakthrough innovations); SYSTEMS OF INNOVATION (Charles Edquist ed., 1997);
Stine Grodal & Grid Thoma, Cross-Pollination in Science and Technology: The Emer-
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B. Teaching Whom?
In addition to the competing policy concerns, transforming the
patent into a readable teaching document raises questions about the
audience. The first concern is that while the public is the ultimate
beneficiary of the disclosure, 208 the document is written to enable a
PHOSITA, and not the general public, to be able to practice the
invention.209 Judge Newman believes that the written description
should not contain known scientific information because it would
greatly enlarge the size of the patent document, increase the cost of
patent prosecution, and "obfuscate rather than highlight the contri-
bution to which the patent is directed."210 Arguably, thicker patent
documents would give pause to the Patent Office, jurists, and mem-
bers of the patent bar.211
gence of the Nanobio Subfield (Sept. 2006) (unpublished manuscript) (manuscript
at 18-22), available at http://www.dime-eu.org/working-papers/wpl3/science-and-
technology (examining how the cross-pollination of ideas between nanotechnology
and biotechnology yielded the new subfield of nanobiotechnology).
208 The disclosure requirement is necessary "in order to give the public, after the
privilege shall expire, the advantage for which the privilege is allowed, and is the
foundation of the power to issue a patent." Grant v. Raymond, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 218,
247 (1832).
209 See, e.g., Verve, LLC v. Crane Cams, Inc., 311 F.3d 1116, 1119 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
(explaining that patent documents are meant to be "a concise statement for persons
in the field"); Ajinomoto Co. v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 228 F.3d 1338, 1347
(Fed. Cir. 2000) (explaining that a patent "is not a scientific treatise, but a document
that presumes a readership skilled in the field of the invention"); In re Folkers, 344
F.2d 970, 975-76 (C.C.P.A. 1965) ('Yet we also recognize that patent disclosures are
not necessarily required to be meaningful and intelligible to the general public.").
210 Ajinomoto, 228 F.3d at 1346-47; see also Loom Co. v. Higgins, 105 U.S. 580, 586
(1881) ("[An applicant] may begin at the point where his invention begins, and
describe what he has made that is new, and what it replaces of the old. That which is
common and well known is as if it were written out in the patent. . . ."); A.B. Dick Co.
v. Barnett, 288 F. 799, 801 (2d Cir. 1923) (noting that the written description is not
addressed to people who are "ignorant" about the subject matter) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted); cf In re Storrs, 245 F.2d 474, 478 (C.C.P.A. 1957)
("[Although] an applicant for a patent [must] give to the public a complete and
adequate disclosure in return for the patent grant, the certainty required of the dis-
closure is not greater than that which is reasonable .... [I]t cannot be forgotten that
the disclosure is not addressed to the public generally, but to those skilled in the
art.").
211 In Judge Rich's opinion, "Not every last detail is to be described, else patent
specifications would turn into production specifications, which they were never
intended to be. United States specifications have often been criticized as too clut-
tered with details to give an easy understanding of what the invention really is." In re
Gay, 309 F.2d 769, 774 (C.C.P.A. 1962); see also N. Telecom, Inc. v. Datapoint Corp.,
908 F.2d 931, 941 (Fed. Cir. 1990) ("It is not fatal if some experimentation is needed,
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The second concern, raised by Professor Timothy Holbrook, is
that structural flaws in the patent system itself "inhibit the ability of a
patent to perform a teaching function."212 For example, he contends
that the Federal Circuit's evisceration of the common law experimen-
tal use exception means that "[o]ne can read the patent but cannot
make or use the invention for purposes of exploring its function or
the manner in which it works [without risking infringement]. "213 Pro-
fessor Holbrook also describes how the teachings in the written
description are often untimely due to delays in publication.2 1 4 Even if
persons in several fields consult the patent for technical information,
he concludes that the disclosure plays a limited teaching role, particu-
larly if the patentee publishes the information in another medium.215
Relatedly, Professor Katherine Strandburg contends that patent dis-
closures are of limited importance because inventions "self-disclose"
through commercialization. 216
First, I agree with Judge Newman that the patent's disclosure is
directed to a limited audience. But while the written description need
not become a scientific treatise, it is also true that, in many ways, a
scientific publication and the patent document share similar goals-
namely to disclose something novel,2 17 to teach fellow artisans how to
replicate the invention or discovery,218 and to spur further innovation
in the field.219 And as discussed above, one long term consequence of
the proposal is that the written description will eventually resemble a
for the patent document is not intended to be a production specification."). Under
current Patent Office practice, applicants must pay additional filing fees for applica-
tions which exceed a threshold page count. See 35 U.S.C. § 41(a) (1) (B) (2006).
212 Holbrook, supra note 28, at 139-46.
213 Id. at 140.
214 Id. at 143.
215 See id. at 146 (describing how "[p]atents can provide a . . . feedback loop to
encourage teachings via pre-patent disclosures and publications," which "further sup-
ports the conclusion that the disclosure in the patent itself is not terribly relevant to
enhancing the storehouse of knowledge").
216 See Strandburg, supra note 28, at 485-88; cf Paulik v Rizkalla, 760 F.2d 1270,
1276 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (en banc) ("[I]t is a rare invention that cannot be deciphered
more readily from its commercial embodiment than from the printed patent.").
217 Professor Rebecca Eisenberg argues that both the scientific community and
the patent system favor full disclosure. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Proprietary Rights and
the Norms of Science in Biotechnology Research, 97 YALE L.J. 177, 217 (1987).
218 See Univ. of Rochester v. G. D. Searle & Co., 358 F.3d 916, 922 n.5 (Fed. Cir.
2004) ("[T]he role of the specification is to teach, both what the invention is (written
description) and how to make and use it (enablement).").
219 See, e.g., Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481 (1974) (explaining
that a patent's addition of knowledge is so important to the public good "that the
Federal Government is willing to pay the high price of. . . years of exclusive use for its
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technical journal. 220 If this happens, it will advance the ability of the
patent document to achieve these shared goals and may contribute
significantly to bridging the divide between patent law and the experi-
mental sciences. Including working examples, combined with some
discussion of what is already known, serves a teaching role because
they both provide context and allow the PHOSITA to more precisely
(and more quickly) replicate the invention or discovery.
Second, many nonacademic patentees choose not to disclose the
technical details of their inventions outside of the patent system.
Indeed, most information disclosed in a patent does not appear in
another medium. 22' This is particularly true in industry, where scien-
tists publish relatively little. 2 2 2 Unlike academic inventors who must
publish their work in order to obtain research funding, attract labora-
tory personnel, build a reputation, and earn tenure, industrial inven-
tors often have little incentive to do so. 2 23 The highest priority for an
industrial inventor is to generate results that show commercial prom-
ise and will ultimately find their way into a marketable product.2 2 4 As
disclosure, which disclosure, it is assumed, will stimulate ideas and the eventual devel-
opment of further significant advances in the art.").
220 See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
221 See Fromer, supra note 28, at 554 ("Much of the information contained in-or
that ought to be in-patents is not published elsewhere."); Second OECD Ministerial
Conference for Small and Medium-sized Enterprises, June 3-5, 2004, WORLD INTELL.
PROP. ORG., Intellectual Property (IP) Rights and Innovation in Small and Medium-Sized
Enterprises, 1 5 ("It has been estimated that patent documents contain 70% of the
world's accumulated technical knowledge and that most of the information contained
in patent documents is either never published elsewhere or is first disclosed through
the publication of the patent application."), available at http://www.wipo.int/sme/
en/documents/pdf/iprs.innovation.pdf (last visited Sept. 17, 2009).
222 See generally Benoit Godin, Research and the Practice of Publication in Industries, 25
REs. POL'Y 587 (1996) (presenting various explanations and using bibliometrics to
assess the usefulness of publication in industry).
223 See generally RICHARD M. REIS, ToMORROw's PROFESSOR (1997) (explaining the
importance of publishing in academia); Anthony J. Kinney et al., Publications from
Industry. Personal and Corporate Incentives, 134 PLANT PHYSIOLOGY 11, 11-15 (2004)
(arguing that the lower publication rate in industry is less about secrecy and more
about the complex balancing of personal and institutional interests). Several com-
mentators contend that publishing can bring rewards to industry. See, e.g., Rebecca
Henderson & lain Cockburn, Measuring Competence? Exploring Firm Effects in Pharmaceu-
tical Research, 15 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 63, 77 (1994) (finding that in drug discovery,
firms which encourage publication in the open literature and use it as a criterion for
promotion are more productive than their rivals).
224 Partha Dasgupta & Paul A. David, Information Disclosure and the Economics of Sci-
ence and Technology, in ARROW AND THE ASCENT OF MODERN EcoNoMic THEORY 519,
522 (George R. Feiwel ed., 1987) ("Roughly speaking, the [academic] scientific com-
munity appears concerned with the stock of knowledge and is devoted to furthering its
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a practical matter, industrial inventors may simply lack the time to
write while on the job or work for an employer who does not want
them to expend the extra mental energy required to put an article
together.2 2 5 And, while publications may benefit industrial research-
ers in a personal sense, many companies do not offer rewards for
them as they often do for patents. 226
Third, most patented inventions are never commercialized or
even licensed. 227 For the tiny fraction that see the light of day as a
marketable product, reverse engineering is often time-intensive, inac-
curate, difficult, or wholly impractical. 228 This is particularly true for
growth, whereas the [industrial] technological community is concerned with the pri-
vate economic rents that can be earned from that stock."); DerekJ. de Solla Price, Is
Technology Historically Independent of Science? A Study in Statistical Historiography, 6 TECH.
& CULTURE 553, 561 (1965) (arguing that while the chief motivation of a scientist is to
publish, the chief motivation of a technologist is to produce a product or process with
limited disclosure before patent rights are secured).
225 See Hicks, supra note 186, at 412 ("After all, writing papers makes no money
and consumes time."). Some industrial employers, however, support and even reward
publication and conference attendance in an effort to attract productive scientists
and to boost their prestige in academic and corporate communities. See G. Steven
McMillan et al., Firm Management of Scientific Information: An Empirical Update, 30 RES. &
DEV. MGMT. 177, 180-81 (2000).
226 Hicks, supra note 186, at 412-13. But see supra note 226 (explaining that
rewarding publications can also convey benefits to industry).
227 See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAw 320 n.52 (2003) (explaining that more than ninety-five
percent of patents are unlicensed and that ninety-seven percent of patents generate
no royalties); Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 Nw. U. L. REv.
1495, 1508-11 (2001) (arguing that devoting more attention and resources to
improved patent examination across the board is unnecessary since most patents are
never licensed or litigated); Doug Lichtman, Substitutes for the Doctrine of Equivalents: A
Response to Meurer and Nard, 93 GEO. L.J. 2013, 2022-23 (2005) ("[M]ost patents sit
idle after issuance, never brought into litigation and never used as the basis for licens-
ing negotiations.").
228 See generally Pamela Samuelson & Suzanne Scotchmer, The Law and Economics of
Reverse Engineering, 111 YALE L.J. 1575 (2002) (examining the legal developments sur-
rounding reverse engineering and their economic consequences); Maureen A.
O'Rourke, Toward a Doctrine of Fair Use in Patent Law, 100 COLUM. L. REv. 1177,
1234-35 (2000) (examining the difficulties of reverse engineering); The Disclosure
Function of the Patent System, supra note 17, at 2016-17 (examining the economic limi-
tations of reverse engineering); Edwin Mansfield, How Rapidly Does New Industrial Tech-
nology Leak Out?, 34J. INDUS. ECON. 217, 221 (1985) ("It often takes considerable time
to invent around patents (if they exist), to develop prototypes, to alter or build plant
and equipment, and to engage in the manufacturing and marketing start-up activities
required to introduce an imitative product or process.").
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technically complex inventions like those in the chemical arts.229 But
even when reverse engineering is possible, the lapse in time between
the initial publication and the fruits of this process can be great. 2 3 0
Further complicating reverse engineering and design-around activi-
ties2 31 is the potential risk of patent infringement, particularly due to
the Federal Circuit's evisceration of the common-law experimental
use exception.232 In the end, reverse engineering plays a limited
teaching role.
It is precisely in these contexts, when the patent system is the sole
medium of disclosure, that the proposal is most important. Under the
current regime, any hope of extracting substantive technical informa-
tion from the disclosure is essentially lost if the patent document is
unreadable.233 By contrast, adopting the heightened disclosure
framework will transform patents emerging from industrial research
into readable teaching documents, which may become rich reposito-
ries of useful technical knowledge.234
229 See Lee Kovarsky, A Technological Theory of the Arms Race, 81 IND. L.J. 917, 960
(2006) (arguing that when reverse engineering is difficult, the inventor may forsake
patent protection in favor of trade secrecy); Munson, supra note 25, at 697-99
(explaining the difficulties for those in the chemical arts intent on reverse
engineering).
230 See Samuelson & Scotchmer, supra note 228, at 1585-88 (describing the time-
consuming research and development steps involved in reverse engineering a
product).
231 Although the patentee can exclude others from practicing the invention until
the patent term expires, there is hope that the patent will foster innovation by induc-
ing others to design around the invention and make new products and processes.
The incentive to design around a patent is a positive result of the patent system. See
London v. Carson Pirie Scott & Co., 946 F.2d 1534, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (explaining
that designing or inventing around patents should be encouraged); State Indus., Inc.
v. A.O. Smith Corp., 751 F.2d 1226, 1235-36 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (stating that designing
around an invention lies at the heart of competition and ultimately benefits the
consumer).
232 Ted Hagelin, The Experimental Use Exemption to Patent Infringement: Information on
Ice, Competition on Hold, 58 FLA. L. REv. 483, 494-504 (2006); see also Holbrook, supra
note 28, at 139-40 ("Commenters have well documented the Federal Circuit's hostil-
ity to the common law experimental use defense . . . ."). The doctrine of equivalents
also creates problems when trying to design around a patent. See Paul N. Katz &
Robert R. Riddle, Designing Around a United States Patent, 45 S. TEX. L. REV. 647,
665-68 (2004); Cecil D. Quillen, Jr., Commentary on Bessen and Meurer's Patent Failure:
An Industry Perspective, 16J. INTELL. PROP. L. 57, 79 (2008) (explaining "[t]he doctrine
of equivalents, which is patent law's 'catch 22' because it makes infringers out of inno-
vators who have successfully designed around a patent's claims"); supra note 101
(explaining the doctrine).
233 See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
234 See discussion supra Part II.B.
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C. The Disclosure-Dedication Rule
Advocating a heightened disclosure standard raises concerns
about the disclosure-dedication rule.2 3 5 It states that subject matter
which the patentee discloses in the written description, but does not
claim, is dedicated to the public. 2 3 6 When the rule is applied, it bars a
finding of patent infringement when an accused infringer practices
the disclosed but unclaimed subject matter.237 One purpose of the
rule is to discourage applicants from narrowly claiming an invention
to avoid prosecution scrutiny by the Patent Office and then, after issu-
ance, relying on the broad disclosure to enlarge the scope of the
claims in patent litigation.238 This is particularly important when the
patentee attempts to prove infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents. 239
Turning to potential tensions between the dedication rule and
the teaching function, one concern is whether the rule creates a disin-
centive for applicants to disclose any more than is necessary to satisfy
235 A lengthy discussion of the rule, and particularly its intersection with other
patent law doctrines, is beyond the scope of this article. For a deeper discussion, see
John R. Thomas, Formalism at the Federal Circuit, 52 Am. U. L. REv. 771, 781-83 (2003).
236 See Miller v. Brass Co., 104 U.S. 350, 352 (1881) ("[T]he claim of a specific
device or combination, and an omission to claim other devices or combinations
apparent on the face of the patent, are, in law, a dedication to the public of that
which is not claimed."); Johnson & Johnston Assocs. v. R.E. Serv. Co., 285 F.3d 1046,
1054 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (en banc). To trigger the rule, and before unclaimed subject
matter will be dedicated to the public, "that unclaimed subject matter must have been
identified by the patentee as an alternative to a claim limitation." Pfizer, Inc. v. Teva
Pharms. USA, Inc., 429 F.3d 1364, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
237 See Maxwell v. J. Baker, Inc., 86 F.3d 1098, 1106 (Fed. Cir. 1996). Thus, the
rule "requires an inventor who discloses specific matter to claim it, and to submit the
broader claim for examination." PSC Computer Prods., Inc. v. Foxconn Int'l, Inc.,
355 F.3d 1353, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
238 See Genentech, Inc. v. Wellcome Found. Ltd., 29 F.3d 1555, 1564 (Fed. Cir.
1994); PSC Computer Prods., 355 F.3d at 1361 (explaining that the disclosure-dedica-
tion rule should motivate patentees to draw the broadest claims that they consider to
be patentable, and to submit these broad claims to the Patent Office for examina-
tion). In terms of policy, the rule reinforces the public notice function of patents. See
Johnson &Johnston, 285 F.3d at 1052 (noting that, consistent with the notice function,
the claim requirement presupposes that a patent applicant defines his invention in
the claims, not in the written description); SciMed Life Sys., Inc. v. Advanced Cardio-
vascular Sys., Inc., 242 F.3d 1337, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that the written
description can assist the public in understanding the notice given in the claims by
pointing out the portions of the relevant art the patent does not cover).
239 For a discussion of the doctrine of equivalents (DOE), see supra note 101. In
determining the range of equivalents to which the patentee is entitled, the Federal
Circuit has held that a patentee cannot use the DOE to recapture subject matter dis-
closed but deliberately left unclaimed. See Johnson &Johnston, 285 F.3d at 1054.
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the disclosure requirements of § 112.240 Another concern is whether
a patentee who discloses too much and inadvertently claims too little
will possibly trigger the rule.
While several commentators might disagree, 241 these concerns
are not problematic. First, it is not easy to trigger the rule. For
instance, the Federal Circuit has made clear that the dedication rule
"does not mean that any generic reference in a written [description]
necessarily dedicates all members of that particular genus to the pub-
lic."2 42 Rather, "[t]he disclosure must be of such specificity that [a
PHOSITA] could identify the subject matter that had been disclosed
and not claimed." 243
Second, the patentee can take steps at the drafting stage to avoid
public dedication problems. For example, the patentee should only
disclose embodiments that will be claimed.24 4 With respect to claim
drafting, one attractive strategy is to draft narrower claims that are
closely tied to the disclosed embodiments in the written descrip-
tion.24 5 This may lead patentees to adopt a patenting strategy where
they prosecute a group of smaller, discrete applications rather than a
single, omnibus application. 2 4 6 These steps not only support the
teaching function, but may also help the patentee avoid problems
with enablement and prosecution history estoppel.247
240 See, e.g., Johnson & Johnson, 285 F.3d at 1064-72 (Newman, J., dissenting)
(explaining that the majority opinion imposes legal obstacles to the disclosure of sci-
entific information which will deter innovation).
241 See, e.g., Raj S. Dav6, A Mathematical Approach to Claim Elements and the Doctrine of
Equivalents, 16 HAR.J.L. & TECH. 507, 516-18 (2003) (explaining that the Johnson &
Johnston decision "will encourage broad claiming of all disclosed subject matter").
242 PSC Computer Prods., 355 F.3d at 1360; see also Holbrook, supra note 28, at
165-67 (discussing the extent of disclosure required to trigger the rule).
243 PSC Comp. Prods., 355 F.3d at 1360.
244 See Dav6, supra note 241, at 517. Admittedly, as ProfessorJohn Thomas points
out, this is easier done in certain fields than in others. See Thomas, supra note 235, at
801 (explaining that, while inventors in chemical, electrical, and mechanical fields
can selectively draft written descriptions that claim one component of a larger prod-
uct or process, those in biotechnological fields must claim each and every aspect of
their inventions).
245 Patentees have devised various claiming methods to avoid dedication
problems. See, e.g., Dav6, supra note 241, at 516-18. One commentator suggests that
the patentee should draft the broadest claim to extend up to the boundaries defined
by the prior art. See Robert A. Migliorini, The Dedication to the Public Doctrine and Les-
sons for Patent Practitioners, 87 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 825, 839 (2005).
246 See Seymore, supra note 40, at 290.
247 See id.; Dave, supra note 241, at 516-18. Prosecution history estoppel is ajudi-
cially-created doctrine which bars a patentee from "'regaining, through litigation, cov-
erage of subject matter relinquished during prosecution of the application for the
patent."' Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 734
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Third, a patentee who discovers a potential dedication problem
after filing has several remedies. For instance, if the patent has not
issued, the patentee can either amend the pending claims to include
the unclaimed subject matter,2 4 8 add new claims directed to that sub-
ject matter,24 9 or file a continuation application. 250 If the patent has
issued, the patentee can file a reissue application within two years of
the issue date and seek to enlarge the scope of the original claims to
encompass the disclosed, but previously unclaimed, subject matter.251
CONCLUSION
It is time to transform the patent into a readable teaching docu-
ment. When the shroud ofjargon and formalism is stripped away and
an actual reduction to practice becomes the standard of disclosure, a
patent has the potential to become a repository of valuable technical
knowledge competitive with other information sources. A more tech-
nically robust patent document will allow follow-on innovators to
more easily and quickly improve on current technologies and will fos-
ter the diffusion of knowledge and more creative innovation within
and across disciplines. And while this proposal would bridge the gap
between the patent laws and the norms of scientific research, it will
also sharpen the debate over the adequacy of disclosure and the
proper scope of claims.
(2002) (quoting Wang Labs., Inc. v. Mitsubishi Elecs. Am., Inc., 103 F.3d 1571,
1577-78 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).
248 See 37 C.F.R. § 1.121 (2008) (describing the amendment process for patent
applications).
249 See id.; Turbocare Div. of Demag Delaval Turbomachinery Corp. v. Gen. Elec.
Co., 264 F.3d 1111, 1118 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that an applicant can add a
claim after the original filing date as long as it finds support in the written
description).
250 A continuation application is a second application for the same invention
claimed in a parent (original) application, which is filed before the parent applica-
tion issues as a patent or becomes abandoned. See 35 U.S.C. § 120 (2006). It has the
identical written description as the parent and enjoys the benefit of the earlier filing
date. See id. In sum, a continuation application is a new application with the same
disclosure but different claims.
251 See 35 U.S.C. § 251 (2006) (stating that a broadened claim can be presented
within two years from the grant of the original patent in a reissue application); see also
Johnson &Johnston Assocs. v. R.E. Serv. Co., 285 F.3d 1046, 1055 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (en
banc) (identifying reissue as a suitable way to retrieve unclaimed subject matter).
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